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Richard Risk*

Canadian Law Teachers in the 1930s:
"When the World was Turned Upside Down"

During the 1930s. scholars in the Canadian common law schools introduced
fundamental changes in ways of thinking about law, changes that made one of
them. John Willis, say 'the world was turned upside down." These scholars
rejected the past, especially the English legal thought of the late nineteenth
century Instead, they were influenced by changes in the United States, which
began early in the century, and by the emerging regulatory and welfare state.
In private law subjects, Caesar Wright was central, using American ideas to
challenge the dominant English authority, especially in his writing about torts.
In public law subjects, the major figures were Willis, W PM Kennedy, Alex Corry,
and Vincent MacDonald They made devastatingattacks on the decisions of the
Privy Council about the division of powers, made imaginative proposals about
statutory interpretation, and justified the emerging administrative state against
the challenges of critics such as Lord Hewart. At the end of the decade, Bora
Laskin embodied the accumulation of these ideas, and at the same time
incorporated tendencies that became dominant after the War

Pendant les annees 1930, d'emnents juristes des facultes de drolt canadiennes
ont introduit des changements fo'damentaux aux fagons denvisager le droit,
changements qui ont fait dire J Pun d'eux, John Willis, que le monde avait 6t6
totalement chamboule. Ces juristes ont rejete le passe, en particulier le
raisonnementjuridique qui prevalaiten Angleterre de la fin du dix-neuvi6me siecle.
Ils ont et6 influences par les changements qui se produisaient aux Etats-Unis
depuis le debut du vingtieme siecle et par 1'6mergence de I'Etat r6glementant et
de I'Etat-providence.Dans les domaines de droit priv, Caesar Wright a 6te un
acteur central, utilisant les idees venues des Etats-Unis pour contester la
domination des arr~ts de principe prononces en Angleterre, en particulier dans
ses textes sur le droit de la responsabilit6. Dans les domaines de droit public,
John Willis, WPM. Kennedy, Alex Corry et Vincent MacDonald ont 6t6 les figures
dominantes. Ils ont lance des attaques devastatrices contre les decisions du
Conseil priv6 sur le partage des competences, ont avanc6 des propositions
originales quant J Iinterpretation des lois et d~fendu I'emergence de I'Etat
administratif contre les contestations des critiques comme Lord Hewart. A la fin
de Ia decennie, Bora Laskin incarnalt I'accumulation de ces idees tout en y
incorporant les tendances ont domine apres la Deuxieme guerre.

* Professor of Law Emeritus, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. I wish to thank Jim Phillips for
reading early drafts and making suggestions, and Philip Girard, not only for suggestions but for
letting me read drafts of his forthcoming biography of Laskin.
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Introduction
This paper is a study of the scholarship done by the teachers in Canadian
common law schools in the late 1920s and the 1930s. A few of them are
now remembered, albeit dimly, but most are now forgotten, and today, law
teachers have no sense of them as a distinctive generation. Yet they
produced a wide range of impressive scholarship, and introduced changes
that continue to shape legal thinking. When I told one of them, John Willis,
that I was interested in this period, he captured both the accomplishment
and a distinctive mood in a single phrase bN exclaiming that it was, "when
the world was turned upside down".' I seek to understand what he meant,

1. All I can remember about this conversation is that it took place by phone after Willis retired,
and was living in Sandy Cove, Nova Scotia.
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and more particularly, to explore the changes they made in ways of thinking about laxN, legal institutions, and their own roles.'
At least fortv indiv iduals taught in the common law schools during this
period, although many of them stayed only for a year or two before leaving to go into practice.' Some \ ere at the forefront of changes, some
follo\Ned a fe\N gasps behind, and some continued in the established ways
of thinking. A list of the ones who did distinctix e scholarship, as judged
both by their contemporaries and in hindsight, may be useful, e\ en if only
to recite some names that may be familiar: Vincent MacDonald, Horace
Read, Forrester Davison, Sidney Smith, and John Willis, all at Dalhousie
Uni\ersity, Herbert Smith, Percy Corbett, and Frank Scott, at McGill
Unixersity, John Falconbridge and "'Caesar" Wright, at Osgoode Hall,
W.P.M. Kennedy, Jacob Finkelman, and Larry MacKenzie at the Universitv of Toronto, James Corr\ and Russell Hopkins at the University of
Saskatche\N an, and Bora Laskin. (Laskin did not have a teaching job until
1940, and therefore does not quite fit into the round dates I have set for
mx self. I have included him nonetheless because he eventually became
4
such an important academic and judicial figure.)
They x\orked in conditions that are a far cry from the present. The
teaching and marking loads \ ere far greater than present ones. Whatever
their relations \xith their colleagues at their own schools, they had little
communication with the teachers at other schools. There were no organizations for meetings, or exchanges of ideas and information; distances were
great; and their meager budgets offered little support for travel. They did
correspond \N ith each other, but not in any widespread, regular way;
instead, most of the correspondence was between friends, or about administrative matters. Their major sources of ideas and information were not
Canadian, but journals and books from England and the United States.

2.
1 do not mean to suggest that law schools in Canada did not flourish and do interesting work
before the 1930s. McGill, especially, was a sparkling school throughout the I920s.
3. The number "forty" does not include many part-time teachers, who were typically practitioners.
4.
There was only one major Canadian scholar who did not fit into my topic at all: D.M. Gordon,
a practicing lawyer in Victoria, British Columbia, who wrote primarily about Administrative Law.
For him, see Kent Roach, "The Administrative Law Scholarship of D.M Gordon" (1989) 34 McGill
L.J. 1.
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1. The Major Themes Introduced
The distinctive moods and ideas appeared first in a few isolated phrases in
the late 1920s and 1930,5 and wx
ere announced early in 1931 with remarkable breadth and clarity in twvo manifestoes, one by "Caesar" Wright and
the other by W.P.M. Kennedy.
Although Wright's given names were Cecil and Augustus, they gave
way to the "Caesar" throughout his life. In 1931, he was at the beginning
of a career that stretched from the late I 920s to the late 1960s. Born in

1900 in London, Ontario, he went to Osgoode Hall Law School after getting a degree in Arts at the University of Western Ontario. He then went to
Harvard Laxk School for graduate work, and returned to Osgoode to teach
in 1926. His manifesto was a talk giv en in January 1931, to the Law Club
at the University of Toronto.' Among the audience was a Bora Laskin,
then in his first year. At the very end of my paper, I shall suggest that this
coincidence was a remarkable portent.
Wright began his talk by declaring a new mood:
The day of faith and credence seems going .... and in its place, we have a

general spirit of skepticism followed often b\ a move towards the empirical
and pragmatic. ... Practically all legal writings of the present time are
permeated v ith a spirit of skepticism as to all our former ideas of law."
Law was Voefully inappropriate for the "modern industrial era". In elaborating its failings, he emphasized the ways of common law reasoning. It
had been autonomous from its social context, and its goals had been dominated by a quest for internal coherence and elegance. It had been "a
subject to be studied and developed in and for itself'. Analysis of this kind

5.
See "\ P.M, Kennedy, "Theones of Law and the Constitutional Law of the British Empire"
in %linute, of Proceedings ,! the Fourteenth Annual %fhetingof the Canadian Bar Association
(Toronto: Carswell, 19301 at 152, reprinted virtually completely in \P M Kennedy, Some Aspects
o1 the Theories and Hrking ol Cons'titutional Law (\ew York. Macmillan. 1931) [Kennedy, Some

pc'et.] (Austin and sovereignty are no longer taken senouslyl: John D. Falconbridge, "The Revolt
of the Silk Merchants" (1 929) 7 Can. Bar Rev. 23 (lak should be studied as a social science); PE.
Corbett, Book Rc, iex of E%%avsin Jurisprudence and the Common Lais b' Arthur L. Goodhart
(1931) 9 Can. Bar Rev. 451 (Austin presents only simple and rigid dogma, and is a paralyzing influence). Jacob Finkelman, Book Review of Fo regn Relations ofthe Federal State" by Harold W. Stoke
(19311 9 Can. Bar Re%.603 (scholars are inclined these days to eschew theoretical discussions, and
to deal with concrete problems) . Horace E. Read, "The Dixorce Jurisdiction Act, 1930" (1931) 9
Can. Bar Rev. 73 (the need tor lavwto express social need and conditions, and references to Pound
and Cardozo).
6.
Cecil A. Wright, "An Extra-Legal Approach To Law" (1932) 10 Can. Bar Re%.I [Wright,
"Extra-Legal Approach"].
7. Ibid. at I.
.4
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" analyzing and comparison of the rules of law themselves" was still a
large part of lawyers' work, but it was not alone enough. As well, law must
be studied as "a means to an end .... The end of law must always be found
outside the law itself'" He was especially concerned about the needs of
business, arguing that the proper approach was "from the standpoint of
what business requires from law, rather than from that of what the law
demands from business." '
Entangled -with this call to make law serve the needs of contemporary
society was an approach he had suggested in the phrase "the empirical and
pragmatic". The essential notion was that the law should be tested by its
results. Speaking of the old beliefs that no longer commanded allegiance
merely because they were old. he said, "there is, ...a demand that they
work and above all produce results.... Today our concern is not so much
with what law is, but why it is and what it is for." Closely related to this
demand was an emphasis on facts, contrasted to the doctrine. "...[N]ot
what the courts say they are doing but what they actually do is the important inquiry today."9
In the past, the claims of individuals against each other and against the
state were labeled rights, which were typically perceived to be hard-edged
and absolute. Yet the contemporary society that law must serve was
complex, changing and interdependent, a world for which these rights were
entirely inappropriate. A more efficient way of recognizing and reconciling the various claims was to assign interests, which could be evaluated,
adjusted and balanced.
Last of all, Wright saw the need to reform legal education, although he
did not make any proposals, except to say that students must be enabled to
understand the needs of business, and "adapt the formulas of a pre-commercialized age to the new situations."' 1
Kennedy's manifesto was given a few months later, in a set of public
lectures at Lafayette University. " In contrast to Wright, he was at the last
stage of his career - a long and remarkable one. Born in 1879 in Northern
Ireland and educated at Trinity in Dublin, he began his scholarly career as
an historian of Elizabethan England, publishing a small handful of books
about ecclesiastical affairs. He came to Canada in 1913, perhaps because
he was unable to get a job in an English University, and after spending a
couple of years at St Francis Xavier College, in Nova Scotia, he moved to

-

8.
9.
10.
11.

Ibid. at 15, 2, 2, 2 and 13.
Ibid. at 1,5 [emphasis in original].
Ibid. at 15.
Kennedy, Some Aspects, supra note 5.
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the University of Toronto. He became interested in Canadian constitutional
history, and wrote a survey in 1922, which became a standard text. In the
late l 9 20s, his interests shifted again, first to contemporary constitutional
affairs, and then to a wide range of legal subjects. At that time, law was a
small branch of the Faculty of Arts, limited to the upper years.
Frustrated in his hopes of becoming head of either political science or
history, Kennedy managed to have law made a separate department, and
himself made its head - and as its head, invited Wright to give the talk
that x%
as Wright's manifesto. "
Speaking to the American audience Kennedy lamented that "[o]ur
progress is slow, our legal traditions extremely conservative" and our law
contains .'many ancient and obfuscated features which are still far out of
tune with the complex civilization of a modem state." He feared "the dead
hand of legal precedent" but saw hope, especially because "our younger
laN ycrs are in close touch with your legal literature which has become a
ast social advance-guard of legal reform." He was pleased that "in some
degree, our law is taking on a social point of %ie%". This word, "social,"
was pervasi'.e throughout the lectures, used in such phrases as "sociological jurisprudence", "social standards," "a social point of view" and "the
socialization of la%\." The essential idea it expressed was that the law must
be "in functional agreement with social demands"; that is, it must be made
to serxe the needs of this society, not its own internal elegance or some
past society. 3
The complexity of modem life required different ways of understanding social conduct, for example, a shift ax\ay from an understanding of
crime as a particular event to "a social e%il \Nhich may be anticipated and
prev ented."'" This complexity and a new conception of the indi\ idual
required that indix idual rights and duties should no longer be the central
elements of the legal framework. Like Wright, he argued that they should
be replaced by social interests, a concept that suggested overlap, accommodation and balancing."
Law making of this kind required a thorough knowledge of social facts
and values, so that law would not be based on "undigested principles or

12. For an account of Kennedy's life and scholarship. see Richard Risk, "The Many Minds Of
WP
KennedN" (1998)4X U.T.L.J. 353.
13
%%c
maintain personality as something inviolate and incommunicable and ultimate and, at
the same time, %%c
maintain that "sell" must imply other "'se es " In a word, the individual and the
social have a nccssary reciprocal implication." (Some 4Apcts. supra note 5 at 23-24,) The earlier
quotations in this paragraph are taken ibid at 22-23. 23, 20, and 25.
14
So , . ft'.p,(.s, supra note 5 at 21.
15. In speaking of thc shift from rights to interests, he said, "before law takes any interests within
its protection there must be a previous comprehens'ie Surxey ofsocial values" (ibid. at 24).
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the untried theories of social cranks." He returned several times to this
need for facts, saying. for example, that "[w]e must learn to create social
machinery for making law, if law is to serve social ends ... [T]he processes
of law\making must themsel\ es be socialized." And it was clear that he
included courts in this requirement. Turning to the education of lawyers,
he argued that -[law] must not be taught in vacuo, apart from the other
"history, economics, sociolsocial sciences." Their training must include
6
ogy, political science and philosophy.'
All these ne\ \ways of thinking about law were to be in the service of a
new politics: The individual, exen though the basic element of civil
society, must not be conceived as the autonomous individual of the nineteenth century -"the older individualism.""
The two manifestoes shared a bundle of assumptions, ideas and
beliefs, which can be gathered into five themes. The first is that they shared
the sense of excitement and urgency that John Willis remembered so clearly
decades later. Even though this mood is implicit in all the other themes, it
is important enough to be made separate. The second, and closely related,
theme was an assumption, sometimes explicit, and implicit when it was
not declared, that the world was fluid and changing. Third, they rejected
the past - both its \xays of thinking about law and its politics. Fourth, in
the place of the past, they sought new ways of thinking about law that
wvould be - in their words - "functional" and "realistic," and that would
serve the changing needs of their own, modem, society. And fifth, they
xwould be participants in making this new wxorld, not merely observers.
These themes were widely shared during the next decade, displayed in
scores of articles, case comments and book reviews.
Kennedy and Wright also differed. Their few words about legal education alone represented a deep gulf. Kennedy sought to make a humane and
liberal education, and Wright sought to prepare students to practice law.
I shall not, though, explore this difference here. More important for my
purposes, Kennedy considered a wider range of sources; he had less interest in common law doctrine: he considered more of the contemporary
political and economic context; and he expressed his political faiths more
openly - the short reference to "the older individualism" was revealing.
Just as the themes they shared were widely shared among the other
scholars, these differences between the two manifestoes represented sig-

16. Ibid. at21,27and25
17. Ibid. at 21. "...[W]e maintain personality as something inviolate and incommunicable and
ultimate; and, at the same time, we maintain that 'self' must imply other 'selves.' In a word, the
individual and the social have a necessary reciprocal implication" (ibid. at 23-24).
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nificant differences. Together, the shared themes and the differences were
vwhat made this generation distinctive, and they are what I seek to explore.
.4A/ap of 1'h1at Follows

For the most part, I will proceed by discussing a parade of scholars and
their writing about a single subject, taking some of them alone and others
in groups. This parade will be ordered by separating common law and
public lax subjects. I do not wish this distinction to serve any rigorous
theoretical purposes. Instead, I wish simply to mark off writing about
common law doctrine from NN
riting about topics that entailed the extensive
use of legislation, even though this legislation required interpretation.
As %%e shall see, this distinction marks a major difference in the scholarship, xhich, as we shall see, was a difference that separated Wright and
Kennedy.
This much is straightforwxard, but tvo long passages, which follow
immediately, create the need for a map, or at least an assurance that I have
a plan. Both provide essential background. The first is an account of legal
thought in late nineteenth century England, which is needed because it
was dominant throughout the legal profession in Canada until the 1920s,
and Awe haxe already seen how much effort the scholars devoted to rejecting it. The second passage is a description of challenges in the United
States to this nineteenth century thought, N%
hich is needed because one of
my central arguments is that these challenges influenced the scholars greatly.

1.England in the Late Nineteenth Century: The Wbrld Left Behind

English legal thought wxas the predominant model for Canadian lawyers in
the late nineteenth century. It has been given several names, which tend to
be associated with different perspectives. For example, "formalism" is
usually used by modem scholars continuing the campaign of rejection,
especially in the ritual slaying that still takes place in first year classrooms.
Instead, I shall use the simple term "the nineteenth-century tradition."
The common law was its essence and foundation, pervading the
day-to-day work of lawyers, their courts, their constitution, their ceremonial speeches, and their ways of understanding their work and their world.
I shall limit the description here to the common lav in the sense of
doctrine made primarily by judges, and postpone considering the public
law elements. The basic elements of this common law were its principles,
arranged among subjects such as contracts and property, and ideally

Canadian Law Teachers in the 1930s

consistent wxith each other."' Beliefs about the sources of these principles
were complex and contested, but it is sufficient for me to suggest that in
England, most la\xxers assumed that they were induced from the decided
cases, and ultimately expressed the experience of the community, elaborated by the judges. The principles changed over time, although the
process of the change and the \alues at stake were rarely explored.
Courts determined disputes, by finding the facts and then selecting and
applying the appropriate principle. Even though they changed, the
principles \\ere stable enough to enable making these decisions. The
outcomes might be contested, but they could and must be reached by
reasoning from the principles, independent of context, values, or social
need.' 9 A lawyer's prediction. or a judge's decision might be influenced by
some considerations outside this structure of authority, but such an outcome would be a mistake - a failure to reason properly.
The primary job of scholars wvas to synthesize and teach these
principles. In England, after the accumulation of great changes in central
topics such as torts and contracts, and the abolition of the forms of action,
the common law desperately needed reconstitution. A small group at
Oxford, including Anson, Dicey, Markby, and Pollock, wrote great texts
synthesizing the principles from this mass of cases for students and for
lawyers to use in their daily work.
In Canada, these ways of thinking were adopted as a matter of course,
and continued to be virtually the only way of thinking from the late nineteenth century to the late 1920s. The leading scholar was A.F.N. Lefroy,
vho taught at the University of Toronto, and explored questions that were
pressing at the turn of the century: did judges make law, how did they
make it, and what were their sources? "'
This common law and its ways of thinking wvere an expression of
political values as well as the technical apparatus for the work of a profession. In short, they were the legal structure of mid-nineteenth century
liberalism, and from this perspective, the texts the scholars wrote were
making or legitimating an ideology. The core tenets were that individuals

18. In the United States, scholars tended to pursue an ideal form, in which, subsidiary principles
were arranged beneath these primary ones, and the entire structure was internally consistent and
coherent, without gaps or overlaps. In contrast, the scholars in England did not pursue this ideal with
nearly the same rigour.
19. The obligation to follow single precedents, which was established late in the century, complicated this structure, but not in ways that need be pursued here.
20. For an account of Lefroy's life and scholarship, see Richard Risk, "A.H.F. Lefroy: Common
Law Thought in Late Nineteenth Century Canada: On Burying One's Grandfather" (1991) 41 U.T.L.J.
307 [Risk, "A.H.E Lefroy"].
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were to have autonomy to make choices about their lives, free from interference by other individuals or the state, and that their liability to others was to be
determined by the expressions of their wills or by conduct that failed to meet
objectiv e standards. The state, through the courts, simply enforced their choices
by applying the principles, objectively and without discretion.

2. Imerican Legal Thought in the Early Twentieth Centui'."
The Coming IiMrld
Challenges to this thinking began in the United States in the late nineteenth century and flourished early in the tx entieth century. Oliver Wendell
Holmes was the beginning, albeit an enigmatic one. In a few short aphorisms - "the life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience,"
and "general propositions do not decide concrete cases" - he seemed to
prophesy much of what x'as to happen. EarlN in the twentieth century,
scholars no\ labeled the Progressives emerged, in a context shaped by
pragmatism, by the burgeoning social sciences, and by political turmoil
and calls for a new social order. The major figures were Roscoe Pound, at
Harvard Law School and later its dean, and Benjamin Cardozo, a judge of
the Ne\% York Court of Appeals.
The titles of two of Pound's articles capture much of their spirit:
2
"Mechanical Jurisprudence" ' and "'Sociological Jurisprudence.:-Calling for "pragmatism as a philosophy of law" he protested at the abstraction from social life, the pursuit of an elegant internal structure, and
the faith that results could be deduced "mechanically" from general rules.
The common law,
must be judged b\ the results it achieves, not by the niceties of its internal
structure; it must be valued by the extent to %hich it meets its end, not by
the beauty of its logical processes or the strictness with which its rules
proceed from the dogmas it takes for its foundation."4
Instead, common law reasoning should be instrumental and seek social
wxelfare. For Pound, the objective was "putting the human factor in the
" 5
central place and relegating logic to its true position as an instrument, '
and for Cardozo, "[t]he final cause of law is the welfare of society.""
21. (1908) X Colum. L.R. 605 [Pound, "Mechanical Jurisprudence"].
22
"Thc Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence" (1911) 24 Ha\.L.R. 591 & (1912) 25
tlar\L.R. 140& 489.
23. Pound, "'Mechanical Jurisprudence", supra note 22 at 609.

24

Ibid. at 605.

25. Ibid. at 609-610.
26. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature ,fthe Judicial Process (NeN
1921) at 66.

Haven: Yale University Press,
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Lawyers should become, in Pound's phrase, "social engineers," a function
that included paying more attention to facts and to enlisting the social
sciences. Nonetheless, the Progressives believed that legal reasoning could
be and should be objective. For them, the common law was a coherent
structure, and systematization of its doctrine was a coherent and useful
enterprise. Its principles were not rigid rules, but guidelines that governed
all but a fe%% difficult cases, xhich would be decided in the light of social
welfare and be the impetus for change. The similarity to Wright's
manifesto is both obvious and important to my story, and I shall return to
it later.
In the late 1920s and 1930s, another group appeared - the Realists.
Even though they created much excitement and controversy, they cannot
be separated sharply from the Progressiv es. Their common ground makes
isolating the differences between them difficult, and these difficulties are
compounded by the diversity among the Realists themselves. Nonetheless, the sharpest difference was that the Realists tended to be skeptical
about the coherence of the common law, arguing, for example, that its
principles v ere intelligible only in the context of particular facts, and could
not provide determinate outcomes. Instead, in deciding disputes, much
depended upon the context and the judge. The Realists did not, though,
deny a large element of predictability. Instead, they sought stability and
objectivity in the social sphere, and turned to the social sciences, especially the behavioral sciences, for guidance for both courts and scholars.

II. The Common Law: The Scholarship Introduced
Most of the writing by my scholars was about the common law, and such
subjects as contracts, property, estates, and torts. Most of it was comments
about recent cases, and the rest was short articles, often prompted by a
case or series of cases, or book reviews. This emphasis on the common
law is hardly startling. These scholars perceived their function to be not
only to educate lawyers, but to support their daily work as practitioners
and judges. Because the welfare and regulatory state was still in its beginnings, the bulk of this work was directed at the ordering of private affairs,
and the common law and the interpretations of a few statutes that consolidated or modified it.
Most of this writing was exposition and analysis of the doctrine. Sydney
Smith is a remarkable example. After serving in the War, getting a degree
from Dalhousie and doing graduate work at Harvard, he returned to teach
at Dalhousie in 1921, where he introduced the case method. After a few
years of growing popularity as a teacher, he went to Osgoode Hall, and
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returned to Dalhousie as dean in 1929. He left law teaching in 1934 to be
President of Manitoba University, and later President of the University of
Toronto. In 1957, he moved to the political world, becoming Secretary of
State under John Diefenbaker, and died shortly afterwards.
Between 1928 and 1934, Smith wrote over eighty case comments, as
well as a large handful of book reviews and a couple of short articles. The
range of topics and his knowledge of doctrine were remarkable, and far
beyond the reach of legal scholars today. The comments, which were no
more than a fe\' pages long, typically described the case and its context in
the doctrine, and demonstrated either that it expressed an important principle in an interesting way, or was at odds with the settled doctrine. Values
and social and economic implications xAere ne\ er considered, except for a
feA expressions of a faith in individual responsibility and effort.
Yet understanding Smith is not so simple as reading all these
comments might suggest. In the late 1920s, he wrote to a colleague, Horace
Read, that he hoped to be remembered for "molding and shaping of Canadian destiny through the instrumentality of law, rather than an erudite
analysis of the rule in Shelley's case"; he spoke of "law as a social science" and hoped that Dalhousie would become a "centre of creative legal
thought."'- Later, in discussing teaching materials, he said that he wanted
to make the students "'respond to the new social idea, ... To treat legal
principles as a mere tool for a li\ elihood ... would lea\,e the science of law,
in this new countrv, out of step with the mark [?] of the other social
sciences, and in it lurks a social danger.""
How can these ambitions be reconciled with his scholarship? To say
that he just did not understand what he bAas saying, or that he was not able
to do what he dreamed of doing, assumes that he lacked intelligence, which
was simply not true. Another possibility is that he did not have time to do
the more adventurous scholarship. True, his teaching, his administrative
duties, and his work as an assistant editor of the Canadian Bar Review, all
made a remarkable load, but it doesn't explain the lack of regrets or even a
few small tries. The beginning of a more promising explanation is the
realization that these comments were designed primarily to assist the practicing profession. I shall seek to develop this possibility later, in discussing Caesar Wright.
A handful of other scholars did the same kind of writing as Smith,

27. Letter from Sydney Smith to Horace Read (3 February 1939), Halifax, Dalhousie University
Archives (MS 1-13, Box E-16).
28. Letter from Sydney Smith to Norman Rogers (13 Januar), 1933), Halifax, Dalhousie University Archives i\IS 1-13, Box E-19).
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especially Gordon Cowan and George Crouse of Dalhousie, Frederick Read
of Manitoba, and John Weir of Alberta. Among them, Read and Weir
demonstrated distinctive power and thoroughness, but none of them undertook any analysis of the nature of the common law or its reasoning,
described context, or looked for justification to social need or values.
The large amount of this kind of writing - modest exposition and
analysis of doctrine within the limits of the nineteenth-century tradition is hardly surprising. Even in a period of challenge and change, most of the
scholars did wvhat scholars like them had done for decades. Even though
they were a\ware of the changes, and sympathetic to them, and even though
some professed to have embraced them, their day-to-day work continued
in the familiar \\ avs
1. The Common Law: Falconbridgeand the Conflicts of Laws

In the common law writing, two scholars towered over the others: John
Falconbridge and Caesar Wright. In short, Falconbridge represented the
world that x\as being left behind, and Wright represented the world that
xwas emerging.
Falconbridge wvas born in 1875. and practiced from 1899 to 1915, when
he began to teach at Osgoode Hall, \%here he stayed throughout his long
career. His output was immense. Before 1940, he wrote texts on mortgages, negotiable instruments, and banking, and over sixty articles and
case comments. The largest and most interesting part of this writing was
about Conflicts. He was regarded in England as one of its dominant scholars, being often cited and discussed.
Conflicts was a battlefield during the 1920s and 1930s. The dominant
approach was a traditional one, expressed most famously by Joseph Beale,
of Harvard, the Reporter for the Restatement of Conflicts, which appeared
in 1934, having been preceded by drafts, which appeared in the 1920s. At
its centre was the notion of vested rights, created by the courts of one
jurisdiction, which another court would enforce. The doctrine was a selfcontained, internally consistent set of rules, derived from a few basic principles, such as the territorial sovereignty of nations. The English doctrine
was much the same, although much less conceptual and hierarchical.
Challenges to Beale began in the 1920s, especially from the Realists.
In 1924, Walter Wheeler Cook argued -[o]n the basis of actual observation
of what courts have done and are doing,' '29 that the forum did not enforce a
right created by another jurisdiction, but instead enforced "a right created

29.

"The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws" (1924) 33 Yale L.J. 457 at 464.
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by its own law,"" ° and its decision must be defended entirely "on the basis
of social convenience and practical expediency."' In the same year, Ernest
Lorenzen challenged the enterprise of deducing the doctrine from a few
basic principles,32 and four years later, in 1928, Hessel Yntema argued that
principles could have meaning only in particular contexts and could not
33
control decisions.
Almost all of Falconbridge's writing during the late 1920s and early
1930s was straightforward exposition and synthesis of the doctrine, for
example, a survey of the entire subject for his text on Bills and Notes, or
studies of particular corners, such as contracts or administration of
estates." Here, he was occasionally critical of particular decisions, but
only for their failure to conform to authority.
Two changes appeared after the mid-I 930s. First, he sought to suggest
ne\\ ways of ordering the doctrine, and to make proposals for change more
openly than he had before. In pursuing these objectives, he invoked a wide
range of European literature, as xwell as the more familiar English and
American sources. An example is t\%o articles about renvoi, a renowned
and problematic doctrine. 5 In the first, in 1930, he sought to demonstrate
that renvoi was not a part of the English laxx by undertaking a thorough
analysis of the cases."' Nine years later, in 1939, he treated it in a more
expansi\e xa'. discussing individual cases less and seeking, instead, to
clarity the doctrine and openly suggesting a compromise among the competing views.
Second, and more important for my purposes, he made an effort to take
account of the challenges to the traditional approach. In 1935, in a review

30

Ibid. at 469
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"Territoriality. Public PolcN, and the Conflict of Laws" (1924) 33 Yale L.J. 736.
"The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Las s" (I
1)2s) 37 Yale L.J, 468.
34
See eg " onflict of Lawss Relating to Bills and Notes- ( 1)28) 6 Can. Bar Rev. 356 & 430;
"Contract and Corn%e.ance in the Conflict of La"s" (1933) 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 661 & 817. and "Administration and Succession in the Conflict of Laws~ (1934) 12 Can. Bar Rev. 66 & 125.
35. Fortunatel, for my purposes, it need not be fully described; it isenough to say that in its
simplest form, it raised the specter of two jurisdictions playing ping pong - the doctrine of the first
one specifying the second as the juri'diction Awhose doctrine ssould gov ern the problem and the
doctrine of the second saying that such a problem should be solved by the doctrine of the first one 9
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36. "Ren',i and Succession to Movables" (1930) 46 Law Q Rev 465 & (1931) 47 Lawk Q. Rev.
271. Clearly. he disapproved of the doctrine, but apart from pointing out a few strange results it
could cause, there was no demonstration of disadvantage or advantage, and, more generally, no
reference to social need and values.
37. "Renvoi, Characterization, and Acquired Rights" (1939) 17 Can. Bar Rev. 369 [Falconbridge,
"Renvoi"].
32.
33

Canadian Law Teachers in the 1930s

of Beale's text, he referred to the debate about the basic principle of"vested
rights," and said, It wvould seem better ... to say nothing about the power
of a law or state to create a right, and rather to say that the proper law in a
given situation should be chosen %ith the object of reaching a socially
satisfactory result. Inevitably, each country must decide for itself what
rules of conflict of laws are likely to reach such a result."38
But this \Nas a review. In his own work, he did not integrate this
approach with the general structure of his reasoning or his proposals for
changes in doctrine. For example. in 1937, he discussed characterization
- the process of determining "the juridical nature" of a problem.3' He
analyzed the nature of the question and the different contexts in which it
arose, and then discussed a series of cases and problems, making only a
fe\ small references to the challenges.4" His analysis demonstrated he had
no doubt that characterization was an objective process. Determining the
"judicial nature" of an issue might be difficult and debatable, but it did not
entail any consideration of social context or values. In contrast, four years
before, Cook had mocked the assumption that lines between categories
had an objective existence, permitting them to be discovered by some
"mechanical or logical process." Classifications were inescapably
surrounded by a "twilight zone or penumbra," and meaningful distinctions
could only be made by considering the purposes for which each one was
made.4

Two years later, in his 1939 article on renvoi, Falconbridge went a bit
further towards embracing the challenges. Considering the doctrine of
renvoi generally, he disapproved of accepting it or rejecting it on "supposedly logical ... grounds." Turning to characterization he said, "'itis sometimes a good thing to look before you leap," and made the radical suggestion that a court could peek at the content of a foreign law that might be

38.

BookReviewof.4 Treatiseon the Conflict of Laws byJoseph H. Beale(l1935 13 Can. Bar Rev

531 at 533.
39. "'Characterization in the Conflict of Laws" (1937) 53 Law Q. Re,. 235 & 537 [Falconbridge,
"Characterization"]. See also "Conflict of Laws: Examples of Characterization'- 1937) 15 Can. Bar
Rev. 215.
40- At the outset, he referred to challenges and their quest for means of reaching "desirable social
or economic result[s]" instead of "the mechanical application of rules," and then said that his purpose was the more modest one of discussing specific problems and making suggestions about the
doctrine (Falconbridge, "Characterization", ibid at 240). As well, he made a short reference to
reaching a "socially desirable result" in making new rules for situations that did not fall within the
existing ones (ibid. at 246).
41. "'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws" (1933) 42 Yale L.J. 333 at 334, 335.
Cook did not, though, deny that most problems were comfortably within the core of a classification,
and that logic was nonetheless useful.
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chosen to govern the problem before it, to help it reach "a reasonable
economic or social result." He did not, though, pursue the implications of
this suggestion, instead saying that they needed "further consideration.' 2
In short, Falconbridge continued to be committed to the nineteenthcentury tradition. He read the challenges, and respected them, but did not
make substantial changes in his basic approaches. Happenstance, though,
may ha'e been significant. The challengers were some of the more
enthusiasic Realists. He might have been tempted more if they had chosen
some other field, and some moderate Progressives had written about
Conflicts.
At the end of the decade, another major Conflicts scholar emerged,
Moffat Hancock. After graduating from the law school at the University of
Toronto in 1933 and Osgoode Hall, he did graduate work at Michigan, and
returned to Toronto in 1937. From there, he went to Dalhousie and then to
Stanford, wvhere he became one of the major contributors to the post-war
rearrangements of conflicts scholarship. He wrote little about conflicts while
he \\ as at Toronto - a rev ie\\, a case comment, and an article - but enough
to sugest the future of his ideas, and the difference between him and
Falconbridge. In 1937, while he x\as still a student, he declared allegiance
to the challengers, approving both Ytema and Lorenzen.43 Three years later,
he tackled choice of laNN in torts cases, especially the meaning of a notoriously \ague passage in an old English case.44 Seeking a "functional
approach" and eschewing "purely logical deductions" and "mechanical
reasoning," he offered a reading of this passage that xNas grounded in basic
purposes of the conflicts doctrine, for example, the interest of states in
enforcing their la\\ s for conduct occurring within their boundaries.
Within months, Falconbridge challenged this reading in a case
comment, 5 relying on a close reading of the passage, its "natural con'
struction," 46
and the tendency of the cases. Again, within months, another
case offered Hancock an opportunity to revisit the topic. 4 7 Suggesting that
the English doctrine originated at a time when courts were wary about
applying the law of other states, he defended the American doctrine, which
was similar to his proposed formulation of the English doctrine, because it
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was flexible, offering the court an opportunity to distinguish between mere
4
differences and results that wvere "harsh or unjust.
2. The Common Law: Caesar W1'right and Torts

Wright needs careful study, simply because he was a major figure,
arguably the dominant figure, in scholarship and education from the mid1930s to his death in 1967. Between 1928, when he began to teach and
1940, he published about 120 pieces, the vast majority of them after 1935.
Seven were articles about the common law, legal education and the profession, and the remainder were divided almost equally between book
reviews and case comments. The book reviews covered a vast range of
topics, including jurisprudence, biographies, and texts. The case comments
were virtually all about cases involving the common law, and they too
covered a vast range of topics, including torts, wills, contracts, and
evidence. Amidst this wealth, the case comments were the major and the
most revealing part of his x\riting. and among them, the comments about
torts were representative."
Many of these comments were powerful scholarship, and are all the
more impressive in light of the realization that many of them must have
been written in an evening or two. His most common undertaking was to
criticize a court's reasoning for being confused, inconsistent, or at odds
with the established doctrine, and then to demonstrate how the reasoning
should have been done. An example is his comment on an Ontario case,
Hutson v. United Motor Service.0 The claim was for damage done to a
building leased by the plaintiff to the defendants, who had sought to clean
the floor using gasoline, which exploded in some unexplained way. The
Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from a trial judgment dismissing the
action. Wright approved the result, but criticized the judgments for failing
to distinguish between two different grounds of liability: negligence and
strict liability. Each had its own distinct elements, which the judgments
had jumbled together. Having demonstrated this confusion and presenting
the proper structure of the doctrine, Wright went on to explain how the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, xwhich one judgment had mentioned in an
aimless way, applied to the doctrine of negligence.
As well, Wright often criticized confusion, inconsistency, or gaps in
the doctrine itself, rather than the court's reasoning, usually proposing a

48. Ibid. at 645. Again, he rejected the "mechanical application of verbal formula" (ibid. at 646).
49 . For a survey of the entire span of Wright's tort scholarship, see R. Blake Brown, "Cecil A.
Wnght and the Foundations of Canadian Tort Law Scholarship" (2001) 64 Sask. L.Rev. 169.
50. Case Comment on Hutson v. United Motor Service (1936) 14 (an. Bar Rev. 514.
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reformulation. An example is a comment written in 1939 about Paine v.
5
Colne Valleyv Electricity Supply, a trial decision in England. it dealt with
a question left by the watershed decision in Donoghue v Stevenson, which
had held that a manufacturer could be liable in negligence to a consumer.
In Paine, a worker was injured by a defective piece of electrical equipment supplied to his employer by its manufacturer. The liability of the
employer was clear, but whether the manufacturer was liable depended
upon the answer to the question that had been left unanswered in Donoghue:
what \%as the significance of the possibility that the employer could have
inspected the equipment before installing it? Wright's proposal was that
the duty of the manufacturer continued regardless of an opportunity for
inspection by a stranger, and that a separate inquiry could be 52made to
determine whether the stranger also o,%ed a duty to the plaintiff.
The crucial element of his proposal was a decision of the Supreme
Court about the liability of an occupier of land, in which the court held that
the occupier wkas liable to a plaintiff, e%en though the plaintiff knew about
the danger that caused the injury (and reduced the damages by the degree
of his negligence). Wright argued that this result could only make sense if
the occupier's duty continued regardless of the plaintiff's carelessness.
Therefore, in considering products liability, a failure to inspect by the
injured plaintiff should not bar recovery, and consistency required that a
failure to inspect by a stranger should be treated the same way.
This reasoning, and by implication the justification for his proposal,
were derived from the basic principles of the established doctrine. Wright
never challenged these principles, nor did he seek justification for his
proposals in some general theory of liability, or consider the social
context, for example, industrialization, the rise of the large corporation, or
the Depression. He often said that the modem world was bustling,
complex and changing, but he did not explain how these features shaped
the doctrine or his thinking.
Nonetheless, the accumulation of comments suggests a large measure
of his beliefs. The beginning was the basic principles of the doctrine:
liability should be based primarily upon negligence, supplemented by

51.
Case Comment on Paine v Colne lIWlov Electrici vSupplv (1939) 17 Can. Bar Rev. 210.
52. As well, he proposed that a failure to inspect by the plaintiff be considered as contributory
negligence, and not a bar to recovery, not, at least, in most provinces in Canada, where legislation
had established that contributory negligence was not a bar to liability and, instead, the damages
would be limited by the proportion of the plaintifl's fault.
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intentional torts and strict liability.- Within this structure, he preferred
results that imposed liability on enterprises for the losses caused by their
activities. An example is his discussions of vicarious liability, one of his
favorite topics, beginning with his comment on Kerr v TG. Bright, a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal. 4 The plaintiff's husband was killed
by a motorcycle carelessly driven by a person whom the defendants had
hired to deliver wine. Her claim that the defendants were vicariously
liable succeeded in the Ontario Court ofAppeal. The result pleased Wright,
but the reasoning did not.
Using both English and American sources he synthesized the general
principles about liability for an agent in both contract and tort. For tort, the
liability was based on control - did the defendant have a right to control
the conduct of the agent? Having finished this synthesis, he argued that the
inconsistent results of the cases demonstrated that the notion of control
was not "capable of satisfactory or uniform application under prevailing
business conditions..." Instead, it was a conclusion that followed from
some other considerations. Having reached this stage, he went on to assert
that "vicarious liability is an economic and social, rather than a legal
problem," and that if an agent had become integrated into the defendants
business, liability was "only fair."55
He pursued this analysis of control at length in a series of comments
about cases involving the liability of hospitals for the liability of nurses.5
In 1936, commenting on a set of cases from England, New Zealand, and
Canada, he spoke of "the futility of arguing pure control." The results
depend upon "some other factor which does not appear in the text-book
rules", and upon the answer to "a broader question, does a hospital board
undertake to supply properly qualified nurses..." He did not declare his
preference expressly, but it was clear enough: he believed this undertaking
should be implied.57

53. His understanding of the foundations was derived from American literature, especially from
Bohlen, his teacher, and from Fowler Harper. A text by Harper appeared in 1933, and Wright's
review was not only his first wsriting about torts, but embodied much of what he would say during the
next five years. See Cecil A. Wright, Book Review of A Treatise on the Law of Torts by EV Harper
(1935) 1 U.T.L.J. 193.
54.

Case Comment on Kerr v.TG Bright (1937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 285.

55 Ibid. at 291, 292. In the Court of Appeal, Rowell, C.J.O., had gone further, by saying that more
and more business was done by corporations, %ho could act only through agents, who would usually
be unable to pay a damage award. The employer could insure against liability, and the cost would
ultimately be borne by the general public. Wright said simply that he agreed, and no more.
56. Case Comment on Hospital Liability (1936) 14 Can. Bar Rev. 699.
57. Ibid. at 704, 701, 703.
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He did not explain or justify this preference, but not because he lacked
the power to undertake the task. Instead, he was simply not much interested in theory. He did not explain or justify his preference to impose
liability on enterprises for the losses created by their activities, by considering, for example, internalizing the costs of business, deterrence, passing
costs on to consumers, or widespread spreading of losses, and he did not
explain its relation to the basic principle of negligence. Thinking about
these questions was beginning to appear in American periodicals,"s but in
Canada, only George Curtis. at Dalhousie University, explored them, in an
article proposing loss-spreading as the basis for vicarious liability. 9
Outcomes of this kind shared the same basic justifications as workers'
compensation schemes, which had already been established. As well, they
paralleled the more explicit beliefs and programmes of the welfare and
regulatory state that were being debated in the public law scholarship, for
example, unemployment insurance schemes.
Having sought to understand Wright's ideas about torts, I turn to his
beliefs about the common law. Here, he sought a delicate balance between
three elements: the structure of principles, a need to make choices in
deciding particular cases, and continual change to respond to changing
social needs.
He spoke often of principles as the basic structure and content of the
common law, sometimes adding such adjectives as "fundamental" or "working." They were generalizations from decided cases, and he had no doubt
that they could be formulated and understood independent of any particular context, and used to decide cases. One of the major responsibilities of
the profession, especially the academics, was to formulate them carefully,
and to design and use precise and consistent terminology. The restatements
undertaken by the American Law Institute were the outstanding fulfillment of this responsibility, one to which Wright referred often, and about
\Nhich he wrote his longest piece of the decade,"'
The principles were essential for deciding cases, but alone they were
not enough. Wright disdained the belief that they could always simply be
applied to facts to produce decisions, scorning it as a "slot machine" or
"static or mechanical" conception of deciding. This disdain, usually
expressed as a rejection of "logic", was widely shared throughout this
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generation. Therefore courts must make choices, and these choices must
involve "some conception of the value of the result."16' Whether Wright
believed that these choices must be made in every case, or whether there
were some that could be decided by a straightforward application of
principles was not entirely clear. A few short passages in general discussions \\ ere conflicting, but his discussions of cases in the comments clearly
demonstrated an assumption that many cases, probably the vast majority,
could be, and should be, decided without discretion, and for the others, the
principles w'ere essential guidelines for ordering thinking.
Wright had no doubt that principles changed. -[T]he static or mechanical concept of law has never at any stage in our legal history been true
62
nor can it be true. That our law has changed and will change, is undoubted."
The change came from the challenge of difficult cases, ones that did not fit
comfortably within the terms of an existing principle. The decisions in
these cases depended upon "logic, a \ iew as to what is expedient, [and]
some notion of the social or economic implications of the problem before
the court.1"6 3 In using "logic" in this context, he was not referring to the
belief that general principles could decide all cases. Instead, he probably
meant a combination of technical craft and the limits of the changes that
seemed to be permitted by the existing structure. In 1931, he said, "the
courts may not make law out of thin air. .. .they are limited by the existing
legal material before them. But they can shape and reshape that material
by choosing different starting points..."' He said no more about the limits
of change, but my understanding is that he meant the courts must respect
the basic structure and principles of the doctrine. Nor did he consider the
force of precedents at any length, but his case comments demonstrate that
he considered them to be useful guidelines and often a sufficient justification, but just as often not compelling. Within these limits, the standards or
contents of the changes must come from "something external"6 - from
some social need or value outside the doctrine. He said little, though, about
these sources, except for several comments about the need for law to meet
the needs of business.' In general, he seemed to accept the prevailing
values of the contemporary society, and to assume that these values were
unproblematic.

61. "Law and the Law Schools"(1938)16 Can. Bar Rev. 579 at 583,585 [Wright, "Law Schools"].
62. Ibid. at 583-X4.
63. Ibid. at 584.
64. Wright, "Extra-Legal Approach", supra note 6 at 15.
65. Wright, "Law Schools", supra note 61 at 585.
66. One example is his 1931 manifesto (Wright, "Extra-Legal Approach", supra note 6). In one
unusual passage, he spoke of the values of comparative law as a source of ideas. See Wright, "Law
Schools", supra note 61 at 600.
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The manifesto also declared an "'empirical and pragmatic" approach.
These words pointed to the developments in philosophy at the turn of the
century,"7 but for Wright - and all the other scholars of this generation
except Kennedy, these changes were in a very dim background. Instead,
these words were a call for the law and its institutions to be continuously
tested by current social need, and a suggestion of a fluid and changing
w\orld. Associated with this "empirical and pragmatic" approach, was a
need to be "realistic" in reading judgments and doctrine. By saying this,
Wright did not mean an inquiry into the social effects of the decisions.
Instead, he usually meant that the doctrine masked the considerations that
pushed a court to a result. The considerations he uncovered were not,
though, ones like class, power, \alue, or the underlying reasons for
allocating losses. Instead, they were ideas that were consistent with the
general structure of the doctrine.
These understandings of the common law% were the rejection of the
past that Wright had announced in his manifesto. This rejection was
complex, because he shared more with his ancestors than he acknowledged. Like most of the scholars of his generation, he created a caricature
for the purpose of a ritual slaying." Lefroy. too, believed that the common
law changed, that it sometimes was incomplete, and that judges made
choices, and he xas no less \ ague than \\'right about the sources for
making changes.,' Nonetheless, there \%ere two large differences between
them. First, the nineteenth century scholars had much more faith than
Wright in the power of precedent and the feasibity of deducing results
from principles, independently of context. This was the "logic" that he and
most of his generation scorned. Second, Wright believed that larger changes
were needed, and needed urgently." Yet these differences alone do not
explain the forcefulness of the rejection. It was amplified by a rejection of
the politics that the nineteenth century doctrine embodied. As we have
seen, Wright did not openly declare his own politics. Nonetheless, he shared
the prevailing liberal beliefs of most Canadian intellectuals.
His beliefs about the common law were not original or distinctive.
Instead, they were the mainstream of the Progressive thought that was
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dominant in the United States during the 1920s, when he did his graduate
work at Harvard. Pound, especially, seems to have had a large influence
on Wright. One moment that might serve as a symbol came on February
22, 1926, when Pound lectured about "the deficiencies of nineteenth
centur. legal thought," and \Wright took extensive notes.7
He turned continually to the United States for guidance. It was there,
and not in England, that the models x\ ere to be found for common law
reasoning, for legal education, and for the role of scholars. He pointed to
the American cases and scholarl\ literature, especially the Restatements,
as sources of ideas for change. and to its schools, scholars, and texts as
inspirations for the Canadians.~ When he became editor of the Canadian
Bar Rex ieN\, he avowedly sought American contributions.73 In contrast, he
saw the English legal thought as unimaginative and parochial. Its prevailing Austinian positivism \N as "'as deadening to the spirit as it is unproductix e of result," excluding as it did, assessing law by any social or moral
standards.74 It \\as, though, the dexelopments in the early part of the
century that Wright turned to - Pound and the Progressives. He demonstrated little interest in the Realists, nor did the other Canadian teachers.
They cited the ,vriting of the Realists only rarely, and in a few short passages, they disapprox ed their more radical ideas.7"
Wright's beliefs about common law reasoning x\ ere in tension w\ith his
thinking about torts. He scorned autonomous analysis of doctrine, and called
for realism, responsiveness to social change, and "an extra-legal approach
to law." Yet, as we have seen, his case comments did not discuss x alues or
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context. Instead, he adopted the prevailing values, assuming they were
widely shared and unproblematic, and the familiar contexts of middleclass urban life. Not even the Depression intruded. To look for an explanation of this tension by reading his work more closely is to look for thinking
he never did, and to dwell on its existence is to miss the heart of his efforts.
Wright was well read, but he did not care much for theory. The dominant
purpose that ran through all his work xxas to educate lawyers: the courts
who had to decide cases, lawyers who had to argue before them, and
students who had to be trained for both jobs. They were the audience for
whom he wrote. The limits of useful criticism and proposals, and the
limits of leadership were the limits of the changes courts could make, and
to criticize them was just not part of this task. In this light, much of his
general declarations were a call for %korkby someone else, perhaps at some
other time.
This emphasis on the profession is difficult to explain. One possible
reason was a simple delight in using his immense powers of analysis. Another is his passionate beliefs about a legal education: it should be a professional education, yet freed from the dead hand of the Benchers at
Osgoode Hall. His writing demonstrated the useful work that could be
done by scholars, and at the same time accepted the prevailing economic
order - which la\ yers usually prefer.
Last of all in this discussion of Wright, I remember that many pages
ago, I suggested that Falconbridge and Wright represented the world that
\\as disappearing and the x\orld that was emerging, The differences betxx een them x ere much the same as the differences between Wright and
the scholars in the nineteenth century. Both of them believed that principles x\ere the centre of the common lawx, and that these principles changed
in response to changes in their social contexts. A sense of excitement and
urgency, though, shone through Wright's work. He had much less respect
for precedent, and argued, in a way that Falconbridge never did, thatjudges
often must choose between results that the doctrine permitted. He stressed
change more, and was more inclined to criticize and to advocate change.
For Falconbridge, the role of scholar was deferential, and his main function was to synthesize; for Wright, it was to educate the profession to better ways of thinking and its responsibilities. And last, Falconbridge looked
primarily to England and secondarily to Europe for ideas and models, and
Wright looked primarily to the United States.
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Ill. An Introhiction to the Public Law Subjects and the Constitution

So far, I ha,, econsidered a couple of the common law scholars, Falconbridge
and Wright. I turn now to the scholars who wrote about the constitution,
interpretation, and administrative agencies, gathering these subjects under
the heading "public law." This turn marks major differences in the scholarship, \\ hich were the differences suggested by the differences between
Wright's and Kennedy's manifestoes.
First, a brief introduction to the lawyers' understandings of the constitution in the late nineteenth century is needed. The classic exposition was
Dicev's Law ofthe Constitution, written in 1885 as a text for students.7" In
the Introduction, he set himself the task of describing and classifying the
"first principles." He saw three, although only the first two are significant
here." The first was the sovereignty of Parliament. Parliament had power
to make any law it wished, and no other institution had power to override
its laws. For our purposes. this principle is straightforward, even though
explaining it led Dicey into long technical analysis, for example, about
law making by courts and about federalism. The second principle was the
rule of law, which had three parts. First, no individual could be coerced by
the state "except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary
legal manner before the ordinary Courts of the land." Contrasted to this
ideal were "-wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint." The
second part \N as formal equality: government and its officials were subject
to the lam, in the same \ax as all individuals. The individual was free to do
whatever she wished, unless restrained by a law enforced by the courts.
Both these principles had been at the heart of the ideal of constitutional
government for generations. generating images of the tyranny of the Stuart
Kings and their overthrow. Third, the constitution xxas the accumulation of
"judicial decisions determining the rights of private persons." It was the
courts that made the constitution. In this way, liberty was embedded in the
fabric of the law, and better protected than it was by the elegant statements
of paper constitutions - especially the flimsy European constitutions.
Throughout, the liberty of the individual was the central value, and it was
best protected by the courts. This union of the common law, the courts and
lawyers was central to the constitution that Dicey articulated for the lawyers of his generation.

76.
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Albert Venn Dicey, Law of the Constitution (London: Macmillan, 1885).
The third was a minor account of conventions.
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1. Federalism
The Canadian constitution combined Dicey's British constitution and
federalism. This proposition, both simple and adventuresome, was
declared in 1867 in the British North America Act: the provinces "desired
to be federally united into one dominion ... with a Constitution similar in
principle to that of the United Kingdom." The importance of federalism in
Canadian political life made the constitution acentral topic for these scholars
and the one that they wrote about most passionately.
An account of the nineteenth century understandings can best be
presented by returning to Lefroy, who wrote about constitutional law as
well as the common law, especially a massive text about the division of
powers that appeared in 1897. -' Like Dicey, he sought to synthesize
principles, setting out sixty-eight of them, each followed by an extensive
discussion of the cases from which it was derived. The cases were
analyzed in ways that tended to make them consistent with each other, and
the principles were constructed in \\ a\ s that made a coherent pattern. Both
\ ere divorced from their social and political context, including Confederation itself, \Nhich was barely mentioned, and the struggle between the
Dominion and the provinces that raged x hile Lefroy xxas writing.
The interpretation of the B.N.A. Act was far from as consistent and
coherent as Lefroy believed, both at the time he \k rote and after his death.
Most scholars agree that by the middle of the 1930s, the power of the
Dominion goxcrnment xxas much xeaker than the makers of Confederation had intended, and less than any reasonable reading of the B.N.A. Act
\Nould permit. When and how this reduction happened is still debated, but
a reasonabl\ safe suggestion is that much of it was done by Lord Haldane
in three cases decided during the 1920s. The last of these three was Toronto
Electric Commissioners v. Snider, decided in 1925.

9

In the following year,

H.A. Smith, who taught at McGill, wrote a case comment, which set the
frame for analysis for the next decade, at least.'
Smith arrived in Canada in 192 1, from England, where he had been
born and educated. For eight years, he was a powerful force, teaching and
xting
r
about a wide range of subjects. and making ambitious proposals
for reforming legal education.8 In his comment about Snider, he argued

"78. A l.F. I-cfro.x. The Law oI Legislatuic Power in Canada (Toronto: Toronto Law Book and
Publishing. 1897-8) [Lefroy, Legislatik Power].
79. [125] A.C. 396 (PC.).
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-The Residue of Power in Canada- (19261 4 Can Bar Re\ 432 [Smith. "Residue of Power"].
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For accounts of his career, scc R. St J. Macdonald. "An Historical Introduction to the Teaching

of International Law in Canada" (1974) 12 Can. YB. Int'l La\% 67 at 72-74. and Roderick A.
Macdonald, "The National Law Programme at McGill: Origins, Establishment, Prospects" (1990)
13 Dal. L.J. 211 at 256-261.

Canadian Law Teachers in the 1930s

that the Pri'.v Council had misunderstood the structure of sections 91 and
92. making the Dominion's power to legislate for "peace, order and good
(o\ emient" one that vas to be used only in emergencies, rather than an
omnibus power to legislate for the benefit of the country. The result was
that Canada had a constitution "the precise opposite of that which our
fathers hoped and endeavoured to attain."" Smith argued further that the
reason the Prixv Council went astray was its misguided approach to
interpretation, which I shall consider in the next section. In short, it failed
to consider the context of the making of the B.N.A. Act, and the clearly
expressed vision of the founders the\ would have found there.
After Smith left, three Canadian scholars emerged: W.P.M. Kennedy,
who has already been introduced, Frank Scott, of McGill, and Vincent
MacDonald, of Dalhousie. Scott, the youngest, is still an awesome figure.
After studying humanities at Oxford in the early 1920s and taking a law
degree at McGill, he began to teach in 1928. Even then, he was not only a
legal scholar, but also a poet. a socialist activist, an advocate for civil liberties, and sympathetic to French Canadian culture. During the next four
decades, he pursued all these paths with passion, becoming a major poet
and a founder of the C.C.F., defending ci\ il liberties against the Duplessis
regime, and offering Canada a vision of a bicultural country." Compared
to such remarkable figures as Kennedy and Scott, MacDonald was relatively straightfor,\ ard. After getting a law degree from Dalhousie, he practiced in Toronto and Halifax before returning to Dalhousie to teach in 1930,
where he became dean in 1934. " Among the three, Kennedy was the most
prolific, by far, writing seven substantial pieces between 1929 and 1937,
as well as a handful of short notes. MacDonald and Scott each wrote half
as much.
All three continued the attack on the Privy Council, largely in the framework Smith established. The makers of Confederation intended to make a
strong national government, responsible for all matters of general or
national scope, and expressed this vision clearly in the B.N.A. Act. The
Privy Council ignored the terms and their context, and the result was that
the Dominion had far less power than had been intended, and the provinces had far more. Canada's federalism was fundamentally different than
the federalism its makers had intended.

82. Smith, "Residue of Power", supra note 80 at 434
83. See Sandra Djwa, The Politics of the Imagination. A Lije of FR.Scott (Toronto: McClelland
and Stewart, 1987); and On E R. Scott: Eiais on His Contributions to LamwLiterature. and Politics,

Sandra Djwa & R. St. J. Macdonald, eds. (Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1983).
84. See John Willis, A History of Dalhousie Law School (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1979).
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During the first few years of the attack, from Smith's comment in 1926
to around 1930, the protests were about the technique of interpretation the failure to consider the context. In the early 1930s, a different kind of
protest emerged: the mistaken interpretation had rendered the Dominion
unable to perform crucial functions. This protest had two branches, both
based on a firm belief that the original design of the B.N.A. Act- to create
a strong Dominion government - was the appropriate allocation of
powers for the modem nation Canada had become. The first branch of the
protest x as about the power to implement treaties. Canada must be able to
make treaties and to implement them, and the powers to perform these
functions should be assigned to the Dominion. The Dominion government
doubtless had power to make treaties, but its power to implement them
was at best problematic. Second, Canada should establish a welfare and
regulatory state, and only the Dominion could undertake this function, but
its power was at best partial and incomplete. These scholars were the first
to declare this vision of Canada in a sustained wvay: a modem nation,
haN ing power to determine its oNN n international obligations, and a strong
Dominion government, with responsibility and power to guide the making
of a modem state.
Most of the writing was about the second branch. At the outset, it was
a protest about the confusion caused b\ uncertainty about the terms of the
division of powers. For example, in 1932, Scott asked, "What has become
of our federalism? It is a legal morass in which ten governments are
always floundering; a boon to lawyers and obstructionist politicians, but
the bane of the poor public w hose pathetic plea is simply for cheap and
efficient government."" At the same time, though, he was concerned about
the shrinking of the Dominion's powers, and gave as examples its inability
to regulate the grain market, water power in the St Lawrence River,
airplanes, and unemployment insurance, all subjects of national importance. In the same year, Kennedy feared that the pow ers and the independence of the provinces could be exploited by "vast economic interests,"
observing that "the interests at the local centres are often too strong to
allow progress, and they are all too frequently able to strengthen their economic and financial purposes by an appeal to provincial rights."*"
As the ravages of the Depression mounted, the protests became passionate. In 1934, Kennedy declared a crisis.

K5, "The Development of Canadian Federalism" (l931) 3 Proceedings of the Canadian Political
Science Association 231 at 231.
86. Some, Itpctc r, supra note 5 at 103.
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The truth is that we have outgrov\n the British North America Act. The
Dominion of Canada is attempting to-day to carry on the highly complex
life of a modern industrial state under a constitution drawn up for a
primitive community, scarcely emerging from pioneer agricultural
\Vorse still, under cover of all this has been preserved the
conditions. ...
legal, political and economic philosophy of laissez-faire utilitarianism....
Upheld with an almost suicidal tenacity, pro\ incial "rights" have become
national wrongs.... \We ha\ e now a clear choice to make: shall we continue
as a loose league of "sovereign" provinces, into which the unfortunate
judgments of the Pri\ v Council had practically transformed us, surviving
e boldly
legally in order to break culturall, and economically? Or shall NN
recognise that a nation of \ast potential w ealth and remarkable human
achievements must not be sacrificed at a constitutional altar erected in a
far-off pioneer past, and itself long since robbed of creative vitality by the
barren processes of judicial obscuranticism'
A year later, MacDonald said simply that the constitution is "ill-adapted
...to our ne\\ status within the empire, to our present social and economic
organization and needs, and to prevailing political theories which indicate
the propriety or necessity of a greater degree of national control over, and
governmental intervention in,matters of social welfare and business

activity. " "

When the Privy Council declared most of the New Deal legislation

ultra vires in 1937, the three joined in a remarkable symposium in the
Canadian Bar Review. They all agreed that the B.N.A. Act as it had been
interpreted was a denial of the intentions of the makers, and was now

woefully inappropriate for a modem nation. There was no hope for change
from the courts, and therefore it must be amended and appeals to the Privy
Council must be terminated. Scott, after retelling the story of the frustration of the original design, said, "None but foreign judges ignorant of the
Canadian environment and none too well versed in Canadian constitutional law could have caused this constitutional revolution.""' A few pages

later, speaking of the restrictions on cooperation between the Dominion
and the provinces, he said,
This legalistic straining at technicalities will do little to enhance the prestige
of the courts.... Canada has suffered a national set-back of grievous
proportions. A federal government that cannot concern itself with questions
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of wages and hours and unemployment in industry, whose attempts at the
regulation of trade and commerce are consistently thwarted, which has no
power to join its sister nations in the establishment of world living
standards, and which cannot exen feel on sure ground when by some
political miracle it is supported in a legislatix e scheme by all the provinces,
is a government wholly unable to direct and to control our economic
de\ elopment ... It would seem ... that the doctrines of laissez-faire are in
practice receiving ample protection from the courts.9"
The rejection of the nineteenth century beliefs and the embrace of the

regulatory and welfare state were obvious throughout, together with an
urgent need to respond to the Depression. Seen from this perspective, these
protests are a remarkable parallel to the protests of scholars in the United
States to Lochner v. New )1'rk.' Perverse interpretations, shaped by political faiths from the nineteenth century, had frustrated making the modem
state. At the same time, the distance from scholars in the late nineteenth
century like Lefroy was made clear by the role of scholars as critics, their
open belief that the law must express the needs and values of the present,
and their aspiration to create the new state.9 2
2. Inte7lwetation
The furor about federalism was a part - a dramatic one - of a much
wider question: how should courts interpret statutes and constitutions?

Again, the beginning is an account of the thinking in the late nineteenth
century. The basic principle was that the courts must determine and implement the intent of the legislature. The primary step in making this determination was to decide whether the words being interpreted had a clear mean-

90. Ibid. at 411-49,2 Kennedy agreed: "\c must no longer lie in the \ain world of delusion that
the Judicial Committee will do for the Act what the Supreme Court of the United States has been
able to do.
\c would have laced this issue long ago had se not too largely believed that constitutional and legal wisdom never really crossed the Atlantic." ("The British North America Act: Past
and Future" (1 937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 393 at 39X) MacDonald said simply that the decisions "go a
long way towards depriving Canada of adequate legislative power to meet effectively pressing national necessities." ("The Canadian Constitution Seventx Years After" (1937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 401
at 42 1.)
1
I1 X U.S. 45 (1905).

)2

The scholarship about federalism was almost the only topic \\ ithin the usual range of the term

"'constitutional " There was, inparticular, little writing about individual rights, and virtually all ofit
was by Scot. In 1910. in "The Privy Council and Minority Rights" (1930) 37 Queens Quarterly
668, he challenged the argument that the appeals to the Priny Council protected minority rights,

demonstrating that wshat it had done \%as to protect pro incial rights, not minority rights. During the
next few years, he published a handful of powerful indictments of efforts to restrict the political
activities of labour leaders and communists.
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ing, and if they did, it must be followed, even if it was contrary to the
known preferences of the legislature, or to the court's sense of justice or
the public good. These lawyers did not, though, contrary to what is sometimes noN\ assumed, believe that words always had clear meanings,
considered either alone or in their textual context. If the words did not
have clear meaning (or if the meaning led to a startling result) most texts
agreed that the court must reconstruct the intent of the legislature.
Nonetheless, this call for an inquiry into intention was obscured, even
sometimes negated, by sharp restrictions on the sources the courts could
consider. Among the sources that were permitted, the primary ones were
the common law and other statutes. What had happened in the legislature
wshen the statute wvas discussed was put firmly beyond bounds. In this
scheme, the dominant source of meanings became the common law,
especially its presumptions, such as the preferences for property and
individual liberty.1
Two Canadian examples illustrate this approach. The first is Lefroy's
federalism text. For him, interpretation of the B.N.A. Act entailed discerning the meaning embedded in its terms. Many of these terms were terse
and general, leavring much to be determined by courts, but even for this
purpose, he rejected considering 'the demands of public policy and the
public welfare."'1 4 The second example is a debate about the decision of
the Privy Council in the Royal Bank case, which need not be described at
length. Two quotations will suffice. Replying to a claim that no one could
doubt the "perfect justice or wisdom" of the Privy Council's decision,
Lefroy said,
All I can assume to discuss is law, not perfect justice or wisdom. Law
may be, and ought to bejust and wise. But whether it is or not, is a matter
with which a lawyer, as such. has nothing to do. That is what the old
philosopher Hobbes meant when he laid down the dictum so shocking to
xeak minds, that "no law can be unjust.""
Another participant, Henry Labatt, agreed. Faced with the claim that the
Privy Council was ignorant of Canadian conditions, he argued that its
ignorance was really a blessing:

93. These ideas are considered at greater length in Richard Risk, "Here Be Cold and Tygers: A Map
of Statutory Interpretation in Canada in the 1920s and 1930s" (2000) 63 Sask. L. Rev. 195.
94. Legislative Power, supra note 78 at 475.
95. "Royal Bank of Canada v. The King", Letter to the Editor (1914) 50 Can. L.J. 622 at 624.
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A controversy determined by jurists of ample practical experience, who
consider the la, and the facts with the intellectual detachment of college
professors forming an opinion in regard to the soundness of abstract
doctrines, may well be said to have been determined under ideal
conditions.""
The first appearance of a new world was the case comment about Snider
by Herbert Smith, which was introduced in the last section. He agreed that
the object of interpretation was to discover the intent of the legislature as
expressed in the words of the statute, but he argued that meanings
depended upon purposes and contexts. Therefore, evidence about the making of a statute, such as parliamentary debates and public speeches, should
be considered. Yet the English courts had deprived themselves of this in".9 This argument was
formation by an "arbitrary and unreasonable rule ....
ultimately much more than an attack on a small corner of doctrine. It was,
as well, a challenge to the power of the courts to govern interpretation by
imposing the common lax presumptions and to preserve values that were
being threatened by the rise of the welfare and regulatory state.
To understand the Canadian scholarship that followed Smith, it is necessary first to understand developments in the United States that began in
the late 1920s and early 1930s. An exchange in 1930 between Max Radin
and James Landis is a landmark."' Radin denied that the search for the
intent of the legislature could be a meaningful undertaking. For issues that
had not been foreseen, the legislature could have had no intent at all.
Moreover, a legislature could not ha\e an intent in any meaningful sense,
for the legislators who supported a typical statute shared a multitude of
different understandings of its meanings, and most of them had little or no
knowledge of its details. The chances that they would all have the same
intent about a particular issue were smaller than "infinitesimally small."99
The text did, though, set limits beyond which the judge must not go, and
within \\ hich a choice must be made. Radin's claim became famous:
...
[S]omewhere, somehow, a judge is impelled to make his selection not quite freely as we have seen, but \%ithin generous limits as a rule by those psychical elements which make him the kind of person that he

96. "Power of Provincial Legislatures to Enact Statute Affecting the Rights of Non-Residents: A
RepIN to Some of My Critics" ( 1915) 51 (an. L.J. 265 at 287.
97. "Residue of Power", supra note 80 at 433.
98. Max Radin, "Statutory Interpretation" (1930), 43 Harv. L.R. 863; and James M. Landis, "A
Note on 'Statutory Interpretation"' (1930) Harv L.R. 886.
99. Radin, ihid. at 870.
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is. That this is pure subjccti'isn and therefore an unfortunate situation is
beside the point." '
In his reply, Landis argued first that an intent about the particular issue at
stake was much more likely to be apparent than Radin had suggested,
especially from looking at the e\ idence of legislative history. More important, if no intent in this sense were discoverable, he proposed that the court
be guided by purpose of the statute, that is, by the general policy of the
legislature. "'[L]egislative purposes and aims are the important guideposts
for statutor-N interpretation." ""
In Canada, three major articles appeared during the next handful of
years, written by Alex Corry, John Willis, and Vincent MacDonald. Corry
and Willis were in the mainstream of change. Both explicitly rejected the
nineteenth century and proposed a ne\\ approach. Because Willis did the
more effective job of the rejection, and Corr), contributed more to the new
approach, they can be best presented by taking Willis first.
Willis was born in England, \,as educated at Winchester and Oxford.
In 1929, he \\ent to Har-vard for two years, where he studied under Felix
Frankfurter. Upon returning to England, his hopes for a teaching job were
frustrated by the Depression. so he \\ ent to Dalhousie to take a job for a
year and stayed in Canada for the rest of his life. To me, he was the most
imaginative scholar of this generation. E\ en as late as the 1970s and 1980s,
he continued to be admired by administrative law scholars.
"'Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell"' 02 appeared in 1937, wvritten in
the preceding summer as a guide for students about to take his new course
in legislation. Still a delight to read, it is one of the landmarks in the
campaign to demolish the traditional approach. The central message was
announced at the outset, and clear throughout. The traditional sources of
meaning were all hopeless guides for "guessing" (a suggestive word that
he used throughout) what a court would do, and for guiding a judge. The
words could not determine results, especially in the world of the modem
regulatory and welfare state, in which "wide and general language"
abounded. Nor could precedent. Instead, the doctrine offered a set of
approaches among which judges could choose freely, and which served, in
the end, to justify some "desired result" - some result desired by the
judges. In the same way, the courts chose whether to invoke a presumption

100. Ibid. at 881.
101. Landis, supra note 98 at 892.
102. (1938) 16 Can. Bar Rev. I [Willis, "'Nutshell"].
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and among them, which one to choose. "What will they do, and not what
\ill they say, is your concern."10
Yet, although demolition was the main aim of "Nutshell," Willis did
not say that interpretation xwas inescapably no more than an expression of
personal and political attitudes. In one short passage, in talking about the
common law doctrine, he came to the mischief rule the courts should be
guided by the "mischief' at wNhich the statute xas aimed. This approach
w\as "so sensible and so thoroughly in accord with the constitutional
principle of 'the supremacy of Parliament.' that it x as "amazing" to find
it used so rarely.

4

Corry is no\ widely known as a political scientist, and few remember
that he began his academic career as a law teacher. Born in southwestern
Ontario, he farmed during World War One and then went west to study law
at the College of Law of the University of Saskatchewan. After graduating
and articling for a year, he went to Oxford for another laN degree. In 1927,
he returned to Saskatchewan to teach at the College of Law, remaining
there until the 1934-35 academic year, when he spent a year's leave at
Columbia La\ School. After returning to Saskatchexan for a year, he went
to Queen's Uni\ersity, forsaking law as his primary interest for political
science. " 5 "Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes,"'0 6
appeared in 1936, a few months after he returned from Columbia.
Corry's rejection of the past \\as based on Radin. Both words and
intent xNere hopeless guides to meaning, for words typically had no clear
meanings, and intent was a myth. " " The words did, though, set limits,
within which the judge must choose. Like Landis, Corry argued that the
judge must respect and implement the purpose of the legislature, grounding this obligation on society's basic commitment to democracy.101
103. Ibid. at I 1,11 ,I and 2.
104. Ibid. at 14. Like Smith, he said that the refus,l to consider the legislative materials made this
approach "unworkable."
105 See James Alexander Corry, My Life & t1;,"k, 4 Happy Partnership. Memoirs of JA. Corn,
(Kingston: Queen's University, 1981 ).
1016 (1936) 1 U.T.L.J 286 [Corry, "Administratime Law"]. The discussion of interpretation %%asa
fek pages sandwiched betmeen an introduction about the kaws courts had dealt with the modem
administrative state, and a long account of the histor-, of interpretation in pnvate la% contexts in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
107. This claim about words, which appeared throughout the writing of this generation, misunderstood its target, for most writers in the late nineteenth centur% did not claim that words alwavs had
clear meanings. The crucial difference, and one which vwasnot clearly e\pressed, sNas that Corry and
his generation assumed, contrary to the earlier scholars, that the uncertainty of words was pervasive,
and that a test alone would rarely give clear meanings about realistic problems.
108. He did not explain the difference between intent and purpose, but it was the distinction Landis
had made, between a specific meaning about the particular problem and the general policy of the
legislature. This distinction was far from radical. It bad been a part of the late nineteenth century
approach, but at its margin, as a circumscribed inquiry when no clear meaning was apparent.
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Though the intention of the legislature is a fiction, the purpose or object

of the legislation is Xer real. No enactment is ever passed for the sake of
its details: it is passed in an attempt to realize a social purpose."'"
This purpose was "-.ery real", an ascertainable fact, and therefore the judge

was not a "despot," eN en though the judge's opinions about "the proper
functioning of the state and its relation to the individual" must shape the
choices about some ambiguities about details. Only rarely was the judge
left to "trust himself." This "real" purpose was a particular form of the
social record in \vhich Pound and Wright sought guidance.'"'
Looking at his footnotes and the surrounding literature, especially the
exchange between Radin and Landis, Corry's proposals made a significant step in the mainstream of change. He embraced Landis' idea of
purpose, but presented itmore fully. More important, not only did he ground
the obligation in democracy, he sa\\ it as an obligation to cooperate with
the legislatures. As well as rejecting the past, Corry, like Willis, instructed
his readers to \\atch what courts did, rather than \%hat they said. This
admonition \as a rejection of a faith in doctrine, paralleling Wright's call
to be "realistic" and the rejection of "logic".
For both Willis and Con- there vas much more at stake than a preference for the word "purpose" rather than the v\ord "intention." Like Wright,
although much more openly, and like the protests at the decisions about
federalism, their thinking about interpretation was part of a campaign for a
change in politics. The older approach to interpretation, especially the

presumptions about property and individual liberty, defied statutes that
were intended to regulate property and redistribute wealth. A new doctrine
was required by a new society. The fighting edge of the talk about purpose,
whatever its analytical difference from intent may have been, was an
attack on the common law and its values as a source of meaning, and a
demand that judges respect these social and political changes and interpret
statutes generously. In the Introduction to "Administrative Law and the
Interpretation of Statutes" Corry spoke of the modem world in which "the
activities of the state are increasing rapidly day by day,"" ' and suggested
that often: "efficient administration is being embarrassed by judicial interpretation."' "2 And at the end of the discussion of interpretation, he gave
judges a blunt warning about the consequences of recalcitrance:

109.
110.
111.
112.

Corry, "Administrative Law", supra note 106 at 292.
Ibid. at292,291,291 and 293.
Ibid. at 288.
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...
there is no other way in which judges can supply the necessary

co-operation for maintaining an orderly process of social change. The
modern state everywhere is engaged in adjusting itself to the machine
age. We are attempting to do under forms of law in an orderly way what
is accompanied elsewhere by violent upheavals, quite regardless of law,
of rights, or of individuals. That is the meaning of the statutes which give
us social legislation and state control over Narious forms of economic
life. At present the judges interpret and apply these statues and thus can
further or obstruct their objects. Unless they are familiar vkith the aim
and purpose of the legislation so as to aid in the adjustment, the orderly
process \ ill fail or pass to other hands.'"
Like Corry, but at much greater length and more colourfully, Willis
demonstrated that the courts had frustrated modem legislation, especially
b~r invoking presumptions. The presumptions that counseled against interpretations that changed the common law or interfered \ith established
rights and property were tolerably accurate expressions of legislative attitudes in the nineteenth century, for legislatures then %\erenot inclined to
take such radical steps.
If in 1937, a court resorts to these old
But times have changed.
presumptions, it is doing something \er-. different from attempting to
ascertain the probable intention of the legislature, it is flying in the face of
the legislature. Only one conclusion can be dra\ n from the present judicial
addiction to the ancient presumptions and that is that the presumptions
ha e no longer anything to do xkith the intent of the legislature; they are a
means of controlling that intent. Together they form a sort of common
la%% "Bill of Rights." English and Canadian judges have no power to declare
Acts unconstitutional merely because they depart from the good old ways
of thought; they can, howe\ er, use the presumptions to mould innovation
into some accord with the old notions. The presumptions are in short "'an
ideal constitution" for England and Canada." 4
If these two articles were in the mainstream, the third, written by
MacDonald, was certainly not. Yet it is one that has a remarkable appeal to
modern scholars. It dealt with the power to implement treaties, and
particularly with Section 132 of the B.N.A. Act, which gave the Dominion
power to implement obligations of Canada "as part of the British Empire
arising under treaties between the Empire and...foreign countries." These
...

113. Ibid. at 293.
114. Willis, "Nutshell". supra note 112 at 17.

Canadian Law Teachers in the 1930s

terms seemed to be limited to treaties entered into by Britain for its colony,
and inapplicable to treaties made by Canada as an independent nation.
Moreover, if intent was the test, surely the British Parliament in 1867 could
barely have conceived of a colony having such a power, let alone have
decided to confer it. Did it ha~e any effect after Canada had become an
independent nation"
In 1933, after the Privy Council gave several confusing interpretations
of Section 132, MacDonald \%rote "'Canada's Power to Perform Treaty
Obligations." "' The essence of his argument was that the basic purpose
of Section 132 was to give the federal government power to implement all
of Canada's international obligations. Even though its particular terms were
designed for the obligations of Canada as a colony, it should be interpreted
"progressivey and liberally" ' , to give the same general power, decades
later, after Canada had become an independent nation. The courts must,
effectually translate into modem terms the language of 1867 so that it
wvill speak \vith equal \itality today w ith regard to circumstances essentially
similar to those en\ isaged for its application in 1867. A constitution is
never to be outgrown but to speak permanently and to be given a
progressive construction %%hich will keep it an apt instrument of
government exen in its application to circumstances not foreseen by its
framers.'-"

MacDonald's argument depended upon a crucial distinction between, on
the one hand, the particular contexts and outcomes that the makers had in
mind and the particular terms they had used - which he usually labeled
"intent," and, on the other hand, the general policy of the legislature, which
he labeled "purpose," "essential purpose", "spirit," "dominant intention,"
and "general policy." What made him distinctive was not simply giving

115. (1933) 11 Can. Bar Rev. 581.
116. Ibid. at 599.
117. Ibid. at 582. A few years later, in 1935. he made the same argument in a comment about British
Coal v.The King, [1935] A.C. 500 (P.C.), in which the Privy Council decided that Canada could bar
appeals to the Privy Council in criminal cases, using remarkably convoluted reasoning based on the
premise that this power had been included from the outset. The result pleased MacDonald, because
it confirmed Canada's status as an independent nation, but the reasoning did not, because in 1867 the
British Parliament would hardly have intended to give such a power to a colony. Instead, he argued,
the Privy Council should openly have acknowledged Canada's independence and interpreted the
B.N.A. Act as giving the power, even though the interpretation would have been different in 1867.
Courts should read constitutions "as speaking the language of today against the background of present
legal and political facts." ("British Coal Corporation and Others v The King: Three Comments"
(1935) 13 Can. Bar Rev. 615 at 632.) The "general policy" of aconstitution should prevail, even if it
required "occasional disregard of the intention of the draftsmen" (ibid. at 633).
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priority to purpose, rather than intent, for we have seen that other scholars,
especially Landis and Corry, made this argument at the same time, and
made it more clearly. Instead, what was distinctive was his argument that
interpretation should be shaped by the contemporary context, and that it
might be at odds with the particular perceptions of the original intent and
even the terms that expressed that intent. Much of the classic literature had
proclaimed the need for law to respond to changing needs and contexts,
but no scholar had been so bold as MacDonald." 8
3. Administrative Law

In England, the expansion of the welfare and regulatory state brought much
debate and much protest from the legal establishment. The protest was
aimed, of course, at the new politics of regulation and redistribution. As
well, though, it was aimed at the institutions and doctrine that implemented
the changes, especially the expanded functions of the executive. The foundations of these constitutional protests \\ere articulated in Dicey's text,
especially in his version of the rule of law. The new state threatened liberty
by displacing the courts and the common law, and giving arbitrary powers
to the executive, which became the modem embodiment of the Stuart Kings.
The protests continued throughout the 1920s, and in response, the govemnment appointed the Committee on Ministers' Powers in 1929, just before Lord Chief Justice Hewart published his famous tirade, The New Despotism." In Canada, the legal establishment made the same protests and
lauded Lord Hewart when he came on a lecture tour. In contrast, the Canadian legal scholars embraced the new state and the politics it expressed,
and the Depression made their embrace passionate. Among them, Willis,
Corry, Kennedy, Jacob Finkelman, and E.A. Hopkins were outstanding. 2°

IIX The Privy Council paid no attention. In Canada (4.G) v Ontario(.4. G.) (Labour Conventions) [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.) it decided that Section 132 was limited to treaties made by Britain for
Canada.
119. (London: E.Benn, 1929).
120. Three others need mention. J.Forester DaN ison graduated from Dalhousie and did graduate
work atHarvard Las School. After returning toCanada fora fes years, he moved tothe United
and
States, where he collaborated with Frankfurter on a casebook. Among the handful of articles
comments he "rote about Canadian topics, only one had lasting significance: "The Constitutionality
and Utility of Advisory Opinions" (1938) 2 U.T.L.J. 254 Nigel Tennant, who also graduated from
Dalhousie and did graduate work at Harvard Law School, wrote one article, "Administrative Finality" (1928) 6 Can Bar Rev. 497, which pointed to the importance of this new field. It sought to
synthesize the doctrine of review, and at the end. suggested that an appeal to the courts was not likely
to give a better decision than the administration had made, and that better appointments were a more
effective means of obtaining good decisions. John Humphre, of McGill, who later became an important figure in the international field, wrote an article about re\ iewvand administrative courts: see
infra note 155. See also R. Blake Brown, "The Canadian Legal Realists and Administrative Law
Scholarship, 1930-1941" (2000) Dal. J. Leg. Stud. 36.
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They probably did not think much about their intended audience, but the
journals in which they wrote and the terms and analysis they used pointed
to the legal profession. Their message, though, was different from Wright's,
because they sought to make a larger change in attitudes and commitments
than he did.
Willis xxas the jewel. His first major publication, The Parliamentary
Powers of English Government Departments, 12 appeared in 1933 as a
response to The New Despotism. Two years later, he wrote "Three
Approaches to Administratix e LaNN ...,22in which the central theme was
the design of the new institutions. Another two years later, in 1938, came
"Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell," followed quickly by two more ar1
ticles. The first, "Administrative Law and the British North America Act," 23
elaborated an argument that he introduced in the "Nutshell." American
lawyers would feel more at home in Canada than the absence of Bill of
Rights might suggest, for the Canadian courts had employed interpretation and presumptions to fashion parallel protections of property and
24
contracts. The second, "Section 96 of the British North America Act,"'
developed one thread of this argument at length. Under the cloak of interpreting this "innocuous section." the courts had created a substantial
limitation on the powers of pro\ incial legislatures to create agencies exercising judicial powers, thereby smuggling the doctrine of separation of
powers into the Canadian constitution. As well, in 194 ],just beyond my
round ending date of 1940, he edited a collection of essays, entitled
Canadian Boards at Mork. 125
2
Corry wrote v o articles. The first, "Administrative Law in Canada,"'
which appeared in 1933, described the new politics and the need for new
institutions it had created. Throughout, his analysis was sensible and
useful, although it lacked the imagination of Willis or of his own article

121. (Cambndge: Harvard University Press. 1933) [Willis, Parliamentar Powers].
122. (1935) 1 U.T.L.J. 53 [Willis, "Three Approaches"].
123. (1939) 53 Harv. L.R. 251 [Willis, "Administratixe La%"]
124 (1940) 18 Can. Bar Rex 517.
125. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1941) (Willis. Canadian Boards]. Although he %%rotelittle in this collection, the very undertaking demonstrated one large strand of his approach: the importance of "what
really happens.'" Between 1933 and 1941, as "well as these sixpieces, Willis wrote a clutch of reviews, including two sparking reviews of books by Thurman Arnold, and two articles about entirely
different topics, the nature of joint bank accounts, and a comparison of English and American approaches to conflicts of laws. The range of topics is impressive, and so isthe range of approaches.
Most of these pieces combined careful analysis of doctrine, with political critique, and middle level

theory.
126. (1933) 5 Proceedings of the Canadian Political Science Association 190 [Corry, "Administrative Law"].
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about interpretation. The second appeared in 1936 - the same year as the
interpretation article, and presaged his shift to political science. It dealt
w ith the public corporation, and especially its promise to solve the central
problem of the twentieth century: -to make economic government ...
responsible to the public weal. ' 2 As well, he did a study for the RowellSirois Commission, which is well know\ n to Canadian scholars, even though
it was never published. Entitled "The Growth of Government Activities
Since Confederation ".'.it was just what its title promised: a detailed
description of the expansion of government, xhich was a large accomplishment and still useful, exen though by 1939 none of it was distinctive.
Kennedy w\
rote only one major article, "Aspects of Administrative Law
in Canada," \ hich appeared in 1934.2 It demonstrated his remarkably
wide range of interests, and an enthusiasm for change and a perceptiveness that were remarkable in someone who xas then 65 years old and had
already done major scholarship in an entirely different field and was at the
same time administering the law school and writing about constitutional
la\\. It included a self-congratulatory account of the work being done at
his school, including the introduction of a course in Administrative Law in
1931, the first in Canada, which Kennedy assigned to a young faculty
member, Jacob Finkelman.
Finkelman graduated from Kennedy's school in 1926, worked for a
year to save his tuition, and spent three years at Osgoode Hall. He was
appointed a lecturer in 1930, becoming the first Jew appointed to a permanent position at the University. In 1936, he published his major contribution to administrati\ e la\w. "Separation of Powers: A Study in Administrative Law." 3 ' Three years later, in 1939, he wrote "Government by Civil
Ser\ ants,"' 3' where he dealt more generally with the nexx state. Last in this
group came Russell Hopkins, who was born on the prairies, graduated
from the Law School at Saskatchew an. and wsent to Oxford as a Rhodes
scholar. After teaching at Kennedy's school for a year, he returned to
Saskatchewan for financial and family reasons, replacing Corry. His
"Administrative Justice in Canada"'' 32 was a comprehensive survey of the
thinking that had accumulated since the late 19 2 0s.

127. "The Fusion of (o\rcmment and Business" (1936) 2 Can. J.Econ. and Pol. Sc. 301.
128. (Study prepared for the Royal (ommission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, 1939) [unpublished] ["The Growth of Government Activities"].
129. (1934) 46 Juridical Review 203 [Kennedy. ",Aspccts of Administrative Law"].
130. (1936)

1 U.T.L.J. 313 [Finkelman, "Separation of Powers"].

131. (1939) 17 Can. Bar Rev. 166 [Finkelman, -'Cxil Servants"].
132 (1939) 17 Can. Bar Rev. 619 [Hopkins, "Administrative Justice"].

Canadian Law Teachers in the 1930s

All these scholars shared a belief that this new state was a product of
fundamental change in social values and demands. Phrases such as "...new
social standards," "new standards," and "new social philosophy" appeared
throughout their writing, and Corry announced, "[s]ocialistic legislation
... is the mainspring of administrative discretion." 13'They also believed
that this change w-as a response to political demands by segments of
society that had been disadvantaged by the workings of nineteenth century
economic liberalism. Their understanding of laissez-faire, a term they
commonly used, may have been simplistic, but they firmly believed that it
was harsh and unfair. Finkelman's account was more forceful than the
others, but they would not have disagreed.
Then came the rude awakening. The romance was ended. Laissez-faire
had failed to bring happiness to the masses of mankind. In fact, the untold
misery and suffering and the social %aste which follo ved in the kake of
the nex% industrial system caused a revulsion of feeling which is gradually
undermining even the positix e achievements of the past century. ... [T]he
operation of that doctrine doomed millions of people to want and
privation. I'"
They were not philosophers and only Kennedy speculated about the theory
of this new state. Building on theories of the new state, including the
English pluralists and, likely, another faculty member at the University of
Toronto, Robert Maclver.s and scattered European writers, he argued that
the state should be conceiN ed not as an abstract sovereign, but as an
association constructed by society to achieve shared purposes. In the
Lafayette lectures, his manifesto, he argued,
we must ... conceive of the state as a definite group-life. ... established by

society as a means to achieve certain purposes. ... It is not a mere policeman
standing on guard to see that %e get our share of liberty and of rights, and
that our neighbour gets his. ....In other words, the state is a great social
engineer and its laws ... are socially created rules of social engineering. 16

133. "Administrative Law", supra note 126 at 194. In "Aspects of Administrative Law in Canada"
Kennedy spoke of a new social philosophy that was committed to, "[c]are of the sick, the poor, the
aged, and the infirm, elimination of slums. control of industry in the interests of humanity, protection
of children, universal education, development of natural resources for the benefit of mankind, all
demand immediate attention" (supra note 129 at 221 ).
134. "Civil Servants", supra note 131 at 171-72 [emphasis in original].
135. Maclver's major work was The Modern State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926). Kennedy never
referred to it, but it was published when he was beginning to think about these topics, and his ideas
paralleled much of its thinking.
136. Some Aspects, supra note 5 at 8-9, 14-15.
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Beginning with this understanding, he turned to the relation between the
individual and the state, arguing that the individual could only be understood and could only flourish as a member of a community, and that
ecause the state was made by the w ill of the citizens, there was "no antithesis between individual and state." Instead, the function of the state was to
'
enable the citizen, "to realize 'the good life,"' and be, "in truth civis. 137
His thinking about the state also included a challenge to the Austinian
sovereignty of the state that was at the heart of nineteenth century English
legal theory. As early as the middle 1920s (thinking not about the administrati\ e state, but about federalism and the struggles to make the League of
Nations), he declared so\ereignty to have been vanquished by both theory
and facts. "No one seriously followvs John Austin, and sovereignty is as
dead as Queen Anne."' 38
I ven though the others eschewed such flights of theory, they were not
content merely to observe and record the changes. Instead, they were participants. In short, paralleling the writing about federalism and interpretation,
they sought to help construct and legitimate the legal structure of this new
state and the legal structure of the new liberalism.' 39 Kennedy proclaimed
this new role, and called on scholars to be creative in pursuing it.
... [T]he teacher of la\w or jurist is no longer merely a contemplative
creature describing the la\\ as it exists. The %ery development of the
administratie system has forced him to be constructive, not only in
interpreting the tendencies of social existence, but also in assisting in
moulding and guiding them.'"
The basic ideas about this structure emerged in England during the 1920s,
and was accepted by the Donoughmore Committee in 1932. " ' The existing institutions of government, particularly the legislatures and the courts,
were adequate to perform the limited functions of the nineteenth century
state, but they did not have the time, the knowledge and expertise, or the
appropriate structures and procedures to perform the new functions.

137. "The Workings of the British North America Acts, IM,7-1931" (1936) 48 Juridical Review 57
at 58-59.
138. s,nic1\t, t%, siupra note 5 at 57.
139. They might usefully be added to historians' understanding of the "government generation".
See Doug Owram, The G, crnment Gencration. Canadian Intellectuals and the State. 1900-1945
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1986).
140. "Aspects of Administrative Law", supra note 129 at 214.
141. U.K., H.C., "Committee on Ministers' Po% crs Report". Cmd. 460 in Sessional Papers, vol. 12
(1931-32) 341
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Appropriate institutions must be created, if they did not already exist, and
given the necessary powers.
The Canadian scholars echoed these arguments, most of them in a
moderate Nvay. Willis, though, was fervent about the need to respect expertise. In Parliamentary Powers, he asked, "why should our system of
goenent be concei\ ed of as a pyramid \\ith the courts at the apex...and
the actions of the Cix ilService. the best informed and most forward looking body of persons in England today, regulated from the point of view of
an outside jurisdiction?" '42 Fortx pages later, he said that the purpose of
most delegation was "to gixe full play to the determinations of the
expert. " 4 " None of the others went so far, and Finkelman, had reservations, wondering, in particular. whether the Canadian civil service had
developed the necessar\ professionalism.44 None of them wxondered about
a tension between democracy and the experts, although their frequent use
of the distinction between polhct - the responsibility of the legislature,
and implementation and detail - the responsibility of the experts,
suggests their answer.
The Canadian scholars realized that e\en though the new state had
been accepted, questions of design remained and would change as needs
and values changed. They sawx a fluid future, in x hich change would be
constant, and flexibility and experiments would be needed, often using
phrases such as "experimental laboratories" and "'ne experiments."'4
They tended to look to experience and "reality" as guides to action, and
some, especially Willis, Finkelman and Kennedy expressly called for
research into "'x
hat really happens," a call corresponding to the calls for
realism and " hat courts did. Moreover, most of them were sensitive to the
Depression, xwhich amplified their sense of urgency, and to the distinctive
circumstances of Canada.
Willis was the one " ho thought most about these questions of design.
In "Three Approaches...," he said the central question was, "how to fit
into our constitutional structure these new institutions whose growth seems
inevitable."'" This question was essentially a choice of an approach to

142. Supra note 121 at 113.

143. Ibid. at 157.
144. Book Reviews of The Administrative Process by JA. Landis, State and Federal Grants-in-,lid
by H.J. Bitterman, and Women Servants of the State, 1870-1938." 4 Histor , of l',mnen
in the Civil
Service by H. Martindale (1940) 3 U.TL.J. 519 at 520.
145. See e.g. Hopkins, "Administrative Justice in Canada", supra note 132 at 621. and Corry, "Administrative Law in Canada", supra note 126 at 191.
146. Supra note 122 at 59.
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designing institutions. After concluding that the approach of the courts
and the "conceptual approach" were utterly inadequate, he suggested a
"functional approach."
how shall the powers of go\ernment be divided up?
The problem put is,
The problem is neither one of law nor of formal logic, but of expediency.
The functional approach examines, first, the existing functions of existing
hat kind of work each has in
gocrnmental bodies in order to disco\er v%
the past done best, and assigns the ne-k work to the body x hich experience
has shown best fitted to perform w~ork of that type. If there is no such
body, a new one is created adhoc. Here, "functionalism" had much the same meaning as "empirical and
pragmatic" had for Wright. The agencies must be designed and assessed to
serve current, concrete social need, and not some abstract ideal. Later, in
Jiurk, Willis specified some particular issues of
Canadian Boards -It
design, and suggested a connection between his functionalism and the earlier developments in philosophy by saying that an agency must be understood by knowing what it did."'
This thinking about designing the ne-, institutions and powers was
entangled with the response to the claims of critics that parliament, the
courts and indivridual liberty \Nere all threatened. One thread of these claims,
based on the principle of separation of powers, was that judicial powers
should not be gixen to the executive or agencies, or at least that any
delegation should be restricted and mistrusted, to protect individual
liberty and abuse of power. The new powvers threatened to offend the principle. In England, the outcome was expressed in vague phrases such as
"quasi-judicial." In Canada, Finkelman made the most elaborate response.
Separation of powers was not a part of the constitution or the common law,
and it was not and should not be a rigid rule. 4 ' Precision was both impossible and undesirable. Instead, the allocation of functions should "serve
practical ends.. .grow[ing] out of necessity and common sense." In particular, the courts needed discretion, to "balance between working effi-

147. Ibid. at 75.
148. Supra note 125 at 2.
149 "Separation of Powers", supra note 130. It Aas not a part of the constitution because Parliament, the executive and the judiciary had each exercised all three functions: legislative, executive,
and judicial. Nor was it part of the common law, because the courts had not developed any clear and
consistcnt meanings of the functions. In both these paths, the reasoning was grounded upon experiencc and "'reality."
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ciencv and the life of the individual citizen."' ' Willis made another closely
related response: the rigid form of the principle was an unworkable and
incoherent product of lawyers' tendency to "conceptual thinking." "Difficulties arise ... as soon as maxims enunciating generalities acquire par-

ticular and fixed meanings ... [T]here is no essential distinction between
the three supposedly distinct types of power."' 5 I The only test was, what

sorts of questions wvere courts best equipped to administer - the functional test.
The major claim of the critics, though. was simply that the agencies
recklessly intruded upon libert, through mistake or excessive zeal. Here,
the scholars made two kinds of responses. The first, made by Willis alone,
was a stark demonstration of the importance of facts and experience,
contrasted to abstract faiths and doctrines. The claim was wrong, because
there had been no abuses. Speaking of po\\ ers to modify statutes, he said,
It is easy to understand a law),' er's horror at this section, for there is nowhere
anN provision for control by the courts: ... No one can deny that there is
some risk in\olved in so waholesale a delegation, but so far there has been
no suggestion of hardship to indix iduals or of usurpation of the
parliamentar\ power. The generality of the \\ords used is not in itself
important: the proper question is what has in fact been done under those
words... I was almost disappointed to find that the orders \xere uniformly
uninteresting. ''

The second response, which was the more common one, took different
forms, but its essence was that the intrusions upon liberty were typically
limitations of property interests entailed in programmes of regulation and
redistribution that had been chosen democratically. The critics were simply defying democratic choice, and the courts had shared this defiance by
hostility to the new state. Willis \\as the most expansive and insightful.
Throughout, his claims were not sweeping abstract generalizations, but
instead, grounded upon the results of the cases. For example, in both
"...Nutshell' and "Administrative Law..." he analyzed cases about
presumptions, and in "Three Approaches..." he considered cases on
discretions and procedural requirements, where much of the doctrine was
about the highly technical limits of the prerogative writs, and where the
results were "a direct product of judicial hostility."'5 3

150.
151.
152.
153.

Ibid. at 341, 342.
"Three Approaches", supra note 122 at 71.
ParliamentaryPowers, supra note 121 at 151-52.
"'ThreeApproaches", supra note 122 at 62.
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He saw the values of class and property as the major source of the
he pointed to "[t]he scandals
hostility. In The ParliamentaryPowers ...
whereby great improvement schemes were
from a social point of viex ...
held up for months by slum ox\ ners upon technical points....,"" and in his
account of presumptions in "Administrative Law..." he said,
The years of depression since 1929 have induced legislatures to pass laws
traditional \xas of thought and therefore
x hich are right out of line %ith
distasteful both to those guardians of the past, the la %yers, and to their
x.ealthy clients who haxe, of course, been adxersely affected by these
55
la\ s. Once more the old ghost of Lord Coke stalks abroad ...
But class and property were not the entire source of hostility. By training
and experience, the minds of laxyers Were shaped to have a predilection
for the common law and its principles, and for courts, contrasted to the
statutes that made the new state, the agencies that administered it, and
their discretions.
...
to a la'. \er a statute does not speak the Iix ing language of the day.
La Ners' ears are attuned to the accents of a forgotten past, new commands
are faintlN apprehended through the fog of the Common Laxw.156
A statute is strictlN construed. It is placed against the background of a
common law whose assumptions are directl. opposed to those of modern
legislation. ... The common law has much to say about private rights,
little of public duties. It is uncompromisingly indiv idualistic. Rights of
property and freedom from personal restraint are sacred ...The judges
have never forgotten the part which their predecessors took in the struggle
bet\Neen king and commons: as men the\ are uncompromisingly hostile
to the executive. 1

7

In these responses to the critics, both Finkelman and Willis argued that the
doctrine had not given coherent, determinate results. Neither suggested
that doctrine was inescapably indeterminate or that judicial decisions were
inescapably the product of politics or chance, and their own common law
Writing demonstrated a faith in the enterprise. Instead, their protests were

aimed at the use of rigid abstract concepts, divorced from context, experi-
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Supra note 121 at 42.
155. Supra note 123 at 273.
156 WiIIis, ParlianentarvI'Power, supra note 121 at 51. The same thought appears at ibid. 171.
157. Willis, "Three Approaches". supra note 122 at 60-61.
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ence, and function. These arguments suggest the American Realists,
although the suggestion depends greatly upon a choice of identity for the
Realists. Neither of them offered any references to make the connection,
and a much firmer connection was to the rejection of "logic". Their aim
was not so much to analyze judicial reasoning as it was to demonstrate the
effect of class and professional prejudice.
In a sharp contrast to post-war scholarship, super\ ision of the agencies
was rarely a major topic or a major battleground. Instead, the discussions
tended to be sanguine, except for some support for rejecting review by
courts on functional grounds and creating an administrative court instead.' 5,
Kennedy was the most imaginative. He considered the potential role of
legislatures in supervising rule-making by the executive, stressing the need
to protect democratic principles and encouraging advisory committees.
He also suggested a specialized branch of the courts for review; and, most
remarkable, he made a suggestion that would become part of modem thinking decades later: the most promising way to facilitate revie"x was to
encourage the agencies "to develop their standards consciously, and by
59
requiring the publication of reasons for their decisions."1
4. The Public Law ScholarshipReviewd
Much of this writing about public law was simply excellent, especially
compared to writing in England. which was scant indeed. Saying this,
though, does little more than please my national pride. More important, it
was different from the contemporary Canadian common law scholarship
in three important ways. i60
First, it openly espoused political beliefs, especially campaigning for
the new liberalism, and it openly considered context. Like Wright, all of
these scholars, except Scott, shared the prevailing liberal faiths of most
Canadian intellectuals. Because Scott's wxriting about public law was
primarily about federalism, and because the making of a socialist state

158. Willis firmly advocated review by an administratike court, in "Three Approaches", ibid. at 7981; John Humphrey, of McGill, agreed. in "Judicial Control Over Administrative Action with Special Reference to the Province of Quebec" (1939) 5 Can J. Econ. and Pol. Sci. 417, but on the basis
of awkward doctrinal reasoning. Two others suggested that such a step might be necessary: Corry, in
"The Growth of Government Activities". supra note 128 at 15-18, and Kennedy, "Aspects of Administrative Law", supra note 129 at 224-228.
159. "Aspects of Administrative Law", ibid. at 228.
160. Note that it is the subject matter that seems to make the difference and not the identity of the
scholars. Most of the scholars who did the major public law scholarship also did major pieces of
common law scholarship without a trace of these distinctive differences. See e.g. J.A. Corry, "The
Custom of a Month's Notice" (1932) 10 Can. Bar Rc. 331. Vincent C. MacDonald, "Statutory
Conversion of Land Into Goods" (1931) 9 Can. Bar Rev. 691; and John W'llis, "The Nature of a Joint
Account" (1936) 14 Can. Bar Rev. 457.
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required the same strong central government as the new liberalism did, he
did not differ from them. Perhaps the reason for this openness may be that
the new state, which the scholars wanted so much, would be made by the
legislature, and the courts were at best supplementary institutions, and at
worst, undemocratic obstacles. The lessons that law cannot be separated
from its context and that the legislature should make the major social
changes were needed only in a world in which the courts were at the centre
of the scholars' legal visions, and not in a country where legislatures were
supreme and that had used the state so much to make its economy. The
need for detachment and objectivity in doing common law analysis was
not as pressing for this work.
Second, it was greatly influenced by the English experience, especially
the rise of the regulatory and welfare state, the debates at the end of the
1920s, and the pervasive perception of the tension between individual
liberty and government tasks. Lord Hexvart and his cohort needed to be
refuted. Except for Corry's article about interpretation, the experience and
wNriting in the United States was mentioned only very rarely, and the
contrast of its appeal to Wright neatly reflected the delicate and shifting
balance of the two Empires in Canadian life generally. Third, it contained
little analysis of doctrine - and almost all of the analysis it did contain
was directed towards responding to critics, not describing doctrine to help
lawyers. Again, the reason may be simply that this analysis was not among
the most pressing issues.
5. Labour Law. Herein ol Bora Laskin and the State of the Art
As the devastation of the Depression mounted during the 1930s, the struggle
between workers and employers intensified. Violence often erupted, and
the state often intervened to support the employers. Late in the decade, the
conflicts began to appear more and more frequently in the courts, and two
scholars began to write extensively about the results: one was Jacob
Finkelman, whom we have already seen in the discussion of Administrative Law, and the other was Bora Laskin. Born in Fort William, he came to
the University of Toronto and Kennedy's school in 1930, where he heard
Wright's manifesto. After graduation, he went to Osgoode Hall for three
years, at the same time working for an M.A. at Toronto. In 1936-37, he
went to Harvard for an LL.M, and then returned to Toronto, where he
worked for a commercial legal publisher and involved himself in labour
research and education, until Kennedy appointed him in 1940, at the very
6
end of my story.' 1

161. 1 hae taken this account of Laskin's life from the drafts of Philip Girard's biography.
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Both Finkelman and Laskin believed in the legitimacy and utility of
collective bargaining and peaceful picketing. Finkelman declared, perhaps
a bit hopefully, "the social utility of trade unions in the modem industrial
community has become almost axiomatic."'' 2 They also shared the belief
that the courts had too often imposed the values of their class and the
nineteenth century faith in individual liberty.
63
Finkelman's major contribution was a long article about picketing,1
in which his major objective was to "analyze the decisions... for the pur64
pose of discovering the principles, if any, upon which the courts proceed."'
This might well have been the purpose of a scholar in the late nineteenth
century, but as well as providing a guide for the profession, Finkelman
sought to demonstrate confusion and inconsistency in the doctrine, and a
pervasive hostility to labour, and as well to demonstrate that both were
greater in Canada than in England. Speaking of the lingering effects of the
nineteenth century, he spoke about the way half-forgotten ideas from the
past can shape attitudes:
[T]he notion that there exists a right to trade has coloured the whole
interpretation of the legal principles relating to trade unions and has often
beguiled the courts into resting judgments on vague generalizations relating
to freedom of trade and individual liberty, rather than on relevant legal
principles. In fact. anyone reading the voluminous judgments relating to
trade-union activities cannot but feel that the approach of the courts has
been instinctive (the act complained of is abhorrent to their economic,
social, and political predilections: such conduct must be circumvented)
65
rather than properly judicial and impartial.
Laskin's major contributions were two articles, both comments on recent Canadian cases, both written while he was at Harvard, both demonstrating his
support for labour, and both shaped by American scholarship and his teachers.
The first,"6 which dealt with the trial judgments in a couple of cases from
Manitoba, began by advocating the use ofAmerican cases as guides for deciding labour issues, and criticizing the courts for blindly following English cases
that had been repudiated by statute. Instead, the courts should be willing to use
the statutes themselves as starting points for common law development that
accommodated the changing social values, an idea that seems lilkely to have
been stimulated by reading Pound or Landis.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
Rev.

"The Law of Picketing in Canada" (1940) 2 U.T.L.J. 67 & 344 at 69.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid. at 76.
"Picketing: A Comparison of Certain Canadian and American Doctrines" (1937) 15 Can. Bar
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In the cases that prompted the article, the court barred picketing in the
absence of lawful strike. Laskin disagreed, arguing that the picketing was
justified by "the remoter interests of labour generally. "...[M]ore than the
sanctity of profits is involved in these controversies."1' As well, assuming
the workers could picket, the court prohibited statements about working
conditions that used such terms as "unfair." Laskin was scornful. "[T]he
bare statement of unfairness as an opinion honestly held should not be
objected to in a country which still boasts of freedom of speech."' 65 Moreover, he argued, both in this article and in a comment written after the
Manitoba Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judgment, that the court's
assessment of fairness tended to express its economic faiths, which were
equally likely to be the faiths of the past - the faith in individualism and
freedom to contract."' Therefore, statements should not be prohibited
unless they wvere defamatorv, deceptive, or intimidating.
The second article, about the labour injunctions to restrain picketing, 70
began \\ ith a long account of the injunction and its abuses in the United
States. Here it was an Ontario case that prompted Laskin to write. Workers had picketed, and after an injunction wvas granted, some union
members who \Vere not employees but who knew the injunction had been
granted, began to picket. The Ontario Court of Appeal held they were guilty
of contempt, and Laskin was again scornful, arguing that the effect of the
holding was that an injunction granted to enforce a private right had been
turned into a public criminal prohibition against the whole community.
Unless the courts exercised their equitable jurisdiction "Xith a spirit of social
understanding,"'" their role was likely to be circumscribed by legislation.
Laskin returned to labour only once more during the decade,7 2 but he
wrote about thirty articles, comments and re\ iex s about a wide range of
other topics. Among them, the major one was "'The Protection of Interests
by Statute and the Problem of 'Contracting Out,"' written while he was in

167 Ibid. at 13.
168. Ibid. at 16.
169. In a case comment in the same year, Laskin spoke bluntly about choices ofthis kind: "A court
which makes a choice here is exercising a purely legislatise function. It is not desirable, nor is it
possible to shut the judiciary off from legislative considerations. But the notions that a court may
adopt here, if it decides to act, must be in line xsith the current mores of the community." (Case
Comment on Allied,4miocemnts Ltd t Reanev & Kcishan Theatres Ltd v.Reaney ( 1937) 15 Can.
Bar Re\ X13 at 817.)
170. "The Labour Injunction in Canada: A Ca\eat" 11937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 270.
171. Ibid. at 283.
172, Case Comment on AI'rop v London PoNenger Transport Board (1940) 18 Can. Bar Rev.
810, which used the case as a springboard for general comments about the need for strong unions
and legislative support for industrial democracy.
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his second 'ear at Osgoode Hall, in 1936, but not published until 1938.'
As its title suggests, it dealt w ith the question when courts should permit
an individual from making a contract to give up a benefit or protection
given to him or her by statute. Again, the introduction revealed much of
his general thinking. Two themes in particular were important. The first
was his version of the underpinnings of the new state. The nineteenth
century theories, which had made the individual will paramount, failed to
understand that Individuals could "be rendered so helpless through
economic privation as to be incapable of having a free will." Change was
needed, "'bythrowing the wxeight of the state behind those interests which
the Individualistic legal theories of an evanescent period have proved pitifully inadequate to protect." The second xxas his beliefs about the role of
courts and legislatures. In the past. the courts had sometimes changed law,
to respond to social change, but their potential was spent. "[T]he responsibility for the protection of new interests and the legal recognition of new
social forces must hereafter be primarily the concern of the legislature and
not of the courts. 4 These thoughts were heady stuff for a young student,
and suggest that he had been introduced to the new ideas at Kennedy's
school.
At the end of this long introduction, he set out the basic principle:
whether contracting out of a protection given by statute could be surrendered depended upon policy of the statute. The bulk of the article
followed: a thorough description of what the courts had done. In the
conclusion, he returned to this basic principle, and the question how to
determine the policy of a statute. Here, Laskin presented an elegant survey
of the developments of the 1930s, especially Corry's article: the rejection
of literal meaning and the will of the legislature, the shift to purpose, the
need to understand the context of making the statue, and the need for
cooperation between courts and legislatures.' 75
In a few comments about common law topics, especially torts, he
repeated his admonition to think in terms of interests, not rights, and
suggested that the reasoning must always be "tentative."' 76 In writing about
interpretation, he repeated, the need to respect "motivating considerations"
and the changes in the public philosophy. 7 ' When the Supreme Court
173. (1936) 16 Can. Bar Rev. 669.
174. Ibid. at 673, 670, 671.
175. The introduction and this conclusion were remarkably detached from the account of the cases.
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176. Case Comment on Camden Nominees Ltd. v Slack(1940) 18 Can. Bar Rev. 393 at 394.
177. Case Comment on Beresford v. Royal Insurance Co., Ltd. (1938) 16 Can. Bar Rev. 393 at 405.

See also Bora Laskin, Case Comment on Industrial Standards Act (1937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 660 and
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invoked the freedom of commerce to sanction a tavern owner's refusal to
serve a coloured person, he argued it had imposed the right to trade, an
economic faith from the past, which had been displaced by comprehensive
legislative regulation. Instead, the court should have interpreted this legislation as prohibiting discrimination.
He wrote about administrative law only once, in a short note apparently prompted by a Supreme Court decision by his former teacher, Felix
Frankfurter."" Here he asserted that regulation was necessary, and the task
was to balance "the maximum of administrative regulation required ... with
the minimum of arbitrary interference in the life of the citizen."' 8 ° The
major purpose of the note seemed to be to introduce American sources,
especially Frankfurter, to Canadian lawvyers.
None of Laskin's major ideas about legal reasoning and institutions
wvas distinctive. Instead, Canadian scholars had introduced all of them in
the first half of the decade. One symbol of this accomplishment was the
first volume of University of Toronto Law Journal, which Kennedy established, and which appeared in the academic year of 1935 and 1936, just as
Laskin was beginning to write. It wxas a dazzling collection of the new
thinking: Corbett on the nexN international law, which we will see in a
moment, Wright on the Restatement of Torts and Agency, Willis on administrative lax,, MacDonald on federalism, Corry on interpretation,
Finkelman on separation of powers, and a host of reviews that shared the
same stances. Yet Laskin was nonetheless remarkable. He incorporated
virtually all the innovations in a wide range of subjects, and can best be
understood as representing the state of the art of legal thinking at the end
of the 1930s.
6. InternationalLaw

Only txmo scholars had a sustained interest in international law: Larry
MacKenzie, at Toronto, and Percy Corbett, at McGill. Both were interesting and important figures, albeit for very different reasons. MacKenzie
was born in Nova Scotia, served in the War, and then went to Dalhousie.
After obtaining degrees in Arts and Law, he worked at the International
Labour Office for a couple of years, before coming to Toronto in 1926.

178. Case Comment on Christie v York Corp. (1940) 18 Can Bar Re\ 314, See also Bora Laskin,
Case Comment on Burton v Power (1940) 18 Can. Bar Rev. 646, a case about speech in public
places, where Laskin demonstrated that the freedom of speech really depends upon the permission
and discretion of the police, and argued for firmer standards.
179. Case Comment on Administrative Tnbunals (1940) 18 Can. Bar Rev. 227. This comment was not
signed, but considering both the style and the subject matter, it was almost certainly written by Laskin.
180. Ibid. at 227.
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The list of his scholarship NN
as long, but most of it was short, descriptive
notes and book rex iews. The few substantial pieces demonstrated enthusiasm and good judgment, but little analysis or imagination. His abilities lay
in managing and leading people, not scholarship. He left Toronto in 1940
to be President of the Unixersity of New Brunswick, and later became
President of the University of British Columbia. '
Corbett, who \\as born in Montreal, obtained two degrees in Arts at
McGill, before going to Oxford as a Rhodes scholar, where he obtained a
B.C.L. He stayed as ajunior fellow and wrote his first article about Interna82 tional Law, an inquirx. into the legal nature of the League of Nations.'
The task -xwas urgent. According to the prevailing doctrine, made in the late
nineteenth century, sovereignt\ was the central concept and the nation states
xxere the sole form of international authority. Even more than in the
domestic world, taming the past was crucial to a modem international order. Corbett sought to enable the construction of international institutions
that were not nation states, bx separating sovereignty from personality.
In 1935, after he had returned to Montreal and joined the faculty at
McGill, he revisited the task of finding an escape from sovereignty in "Fundamentals of a New Law of Nations."' It was, he declared, unacceptable
simply because it was unrealistic. Obser'ation revealed a community of
states, bound together by interdependence and extensive common interests, and accepting order in their relations. "No state can, for any considerable period, successfully \vithstand the common will of a strong majority
in this society."' 4 The doctrine of sovereignty persisted only because, "the
legal mind is notoriously conserati\e, it persists in clinging to theories
and twisting the new facts of life to fit them, rather than admit new theories to account for the facts." '5 He derived much of his analysis from
European thinkers, especially from Hans Kelsen and his Vienna school.' 86

181. For an account of MacKenzie's career, see Peter B. Waite, Lord of Point Grey: Larry MacKenzie
of UB.C. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987).
182. "What Is The League of Nations?" (1924) 5 Brit. Y. B. Int'l L. 119. For an illuminating account of this article and early twentieth century international law thought generally, see David Kennedy,
"International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion" (1997) 17 QLR 99.
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186. His other contributions to international law were a couple of descriptive books about Canada's
role in international affairs and a bundle of reviews. At the outset of his scholarly career, he wrote a
handful of articles and a short book about Roman Law, and during the 1930s, he continued his
interest in European sources by introducing Canadian lawyers to the thinking of Francois Geny.
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Pcrspecti'c
The sense of excitement and urgency, the making of new roles, the rejection of
the nineteenth century legacy, and the embrace of new ways of thinking about
law and a new state were all large changes. Of course,much of the common
law Aays of thinking remained, but enough "as done to justify Willis' exclamation: he and his colleagues had turned their world upside down.
After the war, the United States became the dominant, often the exclusive. exemplar for legal scholars, and England was usually dismissed as
mired in the past or simply ignored. At the same time, the distinctive
elements of the Canadian public law scholarship disappeared. Analyzing
cases, albeit done with a sense of urgency, became a much larger component of scholarship, even in constitutional law and administrative law, and
the open expression of political beliefs disappeared. In the background of
this change were the emergence of the legal process school in the United
States, and the determination of the Canadian scholars to establish and
legitimate their professional schools.
This story, especially the triumph of the American thought, can be
encapsulated, albeit oversimplified, by seeing it as the triumph of Wright
over Kennedy, and especially by looking again at Laskin. He acknowledged much later how much Kennedy had influenced him while he was an
undergraduate. Nonetheless, a few years afterwards, Wright became
Laskin's mentor. Laskin looked to American models just as much as Wright
did, and wrote a flock of case comments that looked just like Wright's.'87
After the war, the two became the most powerful figures in scholarship
and education, and what was distinctive in Kennedy's manifesto and
public law scholarship disappeared.
Yet this look at the future is not part of my story. It has been, instead,
the story of a generation that needs to be remembered, especially in a time
when Canadian law schools seem to be looking for a new identity.
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